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SUPREME

COURT OF NOTRE DAME

GREEN ET AL. VS. HILL.
No. 7.
Promissory Note-Holder in Due Course
-Audtion Sale--Warranty by AuctioneerBreach-Implied Authority-RatificationProcedure, Recovery Limited to Theory
Plead- Instructions - Burden of Proof,
Shifting.
1. Since a party may succeed in a case
only on what he both pleads and proves, the
defendant who pleads by way of confession
and avoidance in an action for the purchase
price of personal property the written warranty by the seller's atictioneer, may not
succeed in the case upon the theory of material misrepresentation or fraud of such
auctioneer.
2. It is not within the scope of the
authority of the auctioneer of personal
property to warrant it unless the seller
actually authorizes such warranty. Where
an auctioneer sells a horse and takes the
purchaser's note with surety, and, without
the direction or knowledge of the seller,
issues to the purchaser a warranty of such
horse, the seller as payee, or the indorsee of
such note, may recover thereon despite such
warranty, unless the seller has ratified the
warranty.
3. Where a seller instructs his auctioneer
not to warrant a certain horse; is not present at the auction or at the time the purchaser's note is taken, and later, upon his
return, accepts such note together with the
other proceeds of his sale; negotiates said
note to the indorsee who, before purchasing
it, informs the seller that the maker had
come to notify him that the horse was not
sound and would be returned, the seller
having no knowledge whatever of the warranty of the horse by the auctioneer given
in violation of his instruction; such facts
are not sufficient to charge the seller with
knowledge of such unauthorized warranty;
nor do they constitute a ratification of the
warranty.
4. A warranty executed by an auctioneer
of personal property without the authority
of the seller may make the auctoineer personally liable, but does not bind the seller.
5. An instruction that the burden of
proof is upon the defendants to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence the 'varranty and breach plead by them is a correct
and necessary statement of the law of the
case, and is not made erroneous by the
failure or refusal of the court to further instruct that, uDon such proof of the warranty
and breach. the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to prove his good faith in the purchase of
the note in suit. In this case such error
would have been harmless for the reason
that defendants failed to establish their defence of warranty and breach.

Action by William Hill against
John Green and Daniel Walker on a
promissory note. From a judgment
for plaintiff the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Leo J. Ward and Maurice F. Smith
for Appellants.
Ralph W. Bergman and Emmett J.
Rohyans for Appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. The issues in
this case were formed by the complaint in one paragraph based on a
promissory note executed by the defendants, and their answer in three
paragraphs: the first, general denial;
the second, breach of warranty; and
the third, alleging fraudulent transfer of the note to avoid defences. A
cross-complaint was filed by the appellant, Daniel Walker, against his
co-defendant and the plaintiff, alleging suretyship on the note in suit.
The cause was tried by a jury which
returned a verdict for the plaintiff
and against the defendants, Green as
principal and Walker as surety. Separate motion for a new trial was
overruled, and judgment was accordingly entered from which this appeal
is prosecuted.
The consideration for the note in
suit was a horse purchased by the
appellant, Green, at the public auction sale of Mr. Osborn. Mr. Osborn
was unable to attend his sale, and
specifically informed his auctioneer,
Mr. Robinson, that this particular
horse was unsound, and instructed
him not to warrant the horse but to
"get as much as possible" from the
sale of the animal. Mr. Green attended the auction in person and himself purchased the horse in question
after personally inspecting the animal
and "trying him out" in the ordinary
manner of testing stock at auction
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sales. The horse was not advertised
as sound or warranted by Mr. Osborn, nor was the horse so represented by the auctioneer to the public
bidders. But to induce the appellant,
Green, to bid and to purchase and
;ettle for the horse, the auctioneer
r g-eed to give him a warranty that
the horse was "sound for wind and
work." Accordingly the auctioneer,
Mr. Robinson, did execute in his own
name, but not in the name of the
seller .or as auctioneer for the seller,
such a warranty and deliver the same
to Mr. Green at the time of taking his
note which the co-appellant, Walker,
Agned as surety.
The day after the sale a veterinary
who happened to visit Mr. Green
casually examined the horse and expressed the opinion that he had "lymphangitus." Mr. Green at once went
to see Mr.- Osborn, but not finding
him, told the appellee, Mr. Hill, whom
he met, of his intention to return the
horse because he was unsound. Later
in the day Mr. Osborn returned to his
home and received the proceeds of his
sale. He then sought to sell the note
to Mr. Hill in order to get the money
with which to pay the auctioneer.
Then Mr. Hill informed Mr. Osborn
of Mr. Green's visit and his avowed
purpose to return the horse as unsound, whereupon Mr. Osborn said he
had not warranted the horse. The
following day Mr. Hill purchased the
note. A week later Mr. Green offered
to return the horse to Mr. Osborn
and demanded his note. Upon being
informed that Mr. Hill had purchased the note, Mr. Green made a
similar offer to him and again demanded his note, which was refused.
As error for which the judgment
should be reversed there is assigned
the overruling of the motion for a
new trial and that the verdict is con-

trary to law. In support of the motion for a new trial it is alleged that
the verdict is not sustained by the
evidence and is contrary to the law,
and that the court erred in the giving
and refusing of instructions.
This case must be decided upon the
issue whether there was or was not a
legal warranty of the horse sold, the
sale of the horse furnishing the sole
consideration for the note sued on.
Appellants cite numerous cases in
support of the general rule that a
purchaser has a right to rely upon
representations made by an auctioneer in effecting a sale, and that such
representations are binding upon the
seller. This is true where the representations are of fact-so material that
the court must construe them as
forming part of the contract between
the parties. Anson on Contracts, pg.
180; Behm v. Burness, 3 Best &
Smith 751. Thus in the case of Roberts v. French, 153 Mass. 60, 26 N. E.
416, cited by appellant, it was held
misrepresentation sufficient to avoid
the contract for the purchase of land
t hat the auctioneer stated specifically
the boundary line measurements and
the actual number of square feet contained in the tract, when as a matter
of fact such lines were shorter and
the number of square feet less than
stated. And so too may a purchaser
avoid his contract where the representations of the auctioneer were
fraudulently made. Anson on Contracts, 199; Hughes v. Robertson,
(Ky.) 15 Am. Dec. 104; Jeffreys v.
Bigelow (N. Y.) 13 Wend. 518-28
Am. Dec. 476; Dowling v. Lawrence,
58 Wis. 282-16 N. W. 552; Lynch v.
Mer. Trust Co., 18 Fed. 486.
But the appellant may not prevail
upon the theory of misrepresentations of the auctioneer of facts material to the contract, nor upon his
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fraud, for neither of these theories is
plead by the appellants. The theory
of their confession and avoidance
plea is the express warranty of the
horse and the breach of such warranty. The distinction between representation of facts which establish
fraud and those which constitute a
warranty is fundamental and vital in
both the substantive and procedural
law. Fraud is proceeded against in
the ex delicto action of case, while
breach of "warranty is remediable in
the ex contractu action of assumpsit.
Chitty on Pleading, Secs. 97-99. A
striking illustration of this important
distinction between fraud and breach
of warranty and the respective procedures involved is to be found in the
early case of Caldbeck v. Simonton,
82 Vt. 69-71 Atl. 881, Sunderland's
Cases on Common-law Procedure,
126.
A maxim of piocedure is that one
may recover only secundum allegata
et probata--on what one. both pleads
and proves. Phillips on Code Pleading, Sec. 79. If therefore, one may
recover only on what one proves, and
may prove only what one pleads, and
appellants plead only a warranty and
its breach, then the court may consider the law and the evidence only
for the purpose of determining
whether appellants have established
such warranty and breach, for on no
other theory may they succeed in the
case.
The auctioneer is the agent of the
seller, and, as in other cases of
agency, binds his principal in all contracts made by him within the scope
of his authority. Roberts v. French,
153 Mass. 60-25 N. E. 416, 25 Am.
St. Rep. 611, 10 L. R. A. 656. But
when the auctioneer exceeds his
authority the seller is not bound,
Bush v. Cole, 28 N. Y. 261; Court v.

Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440, 28 N. E. 718.
A warranty given by an auctioneer is
binding if authorized by the seller
and is within the scope of the authority conferred. 2 R. C. L. 470;
Upton v. Suffolk County Mills, 11
Cush. (Mass.) 586. 59 Am. Dec. 163;
Duff as Pioneer Stock Powder Co. v.
Koontz, Notre Dame Law R'eporter,
Nov. No., page 2, 6. And the buyer
of unsound personal property has the
right to rely on the warranty thereof
even though he may have made perconal inspection of such property before purchasing. First Natl. Bank,
etc., v. Grindstaff, 45 Ind. 158.
In this case appellee's auctioneer
gave to the appellant, Green, an express written warranty of the horse.
Did appellee authorize his auctioneer
to give such warranty? The facts
disclose that he did not. On the contrary, appellee specifically charged
his auctioneer not to warrant the
horse. True in some cases where general authority to sell personal property is conferred upon an agent, such
agent may bind his principal by a
warranty though such authority is
restricted by the principal, unless the
purchaser knew of such restriction.
I Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law 994; Talmage et al. v. Bierhause, 103 Ind. 270,
2 N. E. 716. But this rule does not
apply to the auctioneer. The Am. &
Eng. Enc., supra, quotes from the
English case of Payne v. Leconfield,
51 L. J. Q. B., Div. 642, as follows:
"The question is whether an auctioneer, in the absence of express authority from his'principal, or even in
spite of his authority, can warrant an
article sold at a sale. In regard to
that naked proposition I say he cannot. . . . An auctioneer receives
miscellaneous articles of all descriptions to sell to others. He is simpliciter an agent to sell. His duty would
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be to inquire of his principal if it
were desirable that a warranty
should be given."
An auctioneer has by virtue of his
office no implied authority to warrant
property sold by him. 3 Am. & Eng.
Enc. of Law 491, 2nd Ed. Mechem
on Agency, Sec. 904; Dod v. Farlow,
11 Allen (Mass.) 426, 87 Am. Dec.
726; Com. v. Dickenson, 5 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 506, 43 Am. Dec. 139; McGrew
v. Foresythe, 31 Iowa 179; Court et
al. v. Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440, 28 N.
E. 718. In the Iowa case of McGrew
v. Foresythe, supra, the auctioneer,
in selling a flock of sheep, said:
"Here is a nice lot of young, sound
sheep." The defendant heard the
statement, bought the sheep and gave
his promissory note in payment. The
sheep proved to be diseased with
"scab" at the time of sale, and the
defendant resisted the seller's action
to collect the note. The court said:
"No particular form of words is
necessary to constitute an express
warranty. It is sufficient if the words
used on the part of the owner that the
chattel is what it is represented to be.
Naked praise or simple commendation
of property offered for sale does not,
as a matter of law, amount to a warranty. A bare affirmation of the
soundness of a horse or other animal
which is at the time exposed to the
purchaser's inspection is not per se a
warranty. It is of itself only a representation. To give it the effect of a
warranty it must be shown to the
satisfaction of the jury that the parties intended it to have that effect.
(Citing) House v. Fort, 4 Blackf.
(Ind.) 296." The Indiana case of
Court et al. v. Snyder, supra, was an
action on a promissory note given for
the purchase price of a horse sold at
auction, a case: in every particular
analagous to appellants' case, except

that the warranty of the auctioneer
in that case was not in writing. A
demurrer was sustained to the defendant's answer, and upon this alleged error alone the case was appealed. This answer and the ruling
thereon are interesting in pleading as
well as in the substantive law involved and we therefore quote the
answer at some lnegth: The averments are, that the mare for which
the note was given, and which constituted the only consideration for
such note, was at and before the time
of sale thereof "sick and diseased,
and had the seeds of an internal disease or malady from which she died
in about three months after sale; that
said disease and malady with said
mare was affected was latent, affecting her internal organs and functions, and the same was not discoverable by the utmost care and diligence,
and these defendants did not know or
suspect the existence of the same at
the time of said purchase; that said
plaintiff knew of the said disease or
malady with which said mare was
affected before said mare was sold to
these defendants, and he purposely
concealed the existence therof from
these defendants in order to obtain a
sound price for said mare; that the
more effectually to sell said mare as
sound, he procured and employed an
auctioneer to sell said mare at public
sale; that said auctioneer had full
authority to sell said mare, and he
was not instructed by said plaintiff
not to warrant the soundness of said
mare; that at the time said sale was
progressing, and before the purchase
was made, these defendants inquired
of said auctioneer whether said mare
was sound and free from disease, and
they were informed by said auctioneer
and by another employee of said
plaintiff that said mare was sound
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and free from disease, which information they relied upon as true, and
on the faith thereof they purchased
said mare as sound and free from disease, and for the full value of said
mare if she had been sound and free
from disease," etc. In disposing of
the demurrer to this answer the court
said: "Just what the circumstances
were under which the sale was made,
other than that it was a public auction, is not apparent from the answer. It is nowhere averred that the
appellee was present at the sale or
knew the slightest thing about it, except that he instructed the auctioneer
to sell the animal and did not forbid
him to warrant her. If there is any
fraud shown, it must consist in his
failure to go to the- auction sale and
there to make it known that the mare
was unsound. But this cannot be so;
on the contrary, it is well settled, we
think, that he cannot even be bound
by express warranties made by the
auctioneer, or other special agent, unless he has specifically authorized
such warranty. Richmond, etc., Co.
v. Farquar, 8 Blacfk. 89; I Wait Actions and Defences 487; I Am. & Eng.
Enc. of Law 981. This being the law,
and the appellants being presumed to
know the law, we do not see how it
was possible for them to be legally
defrauded by the acts or statements
of the auctioneer or third party present at the sale. And how the silence
of the appellee could have contributed
to such result when lie is not shown to
have been personally present at the
sale, or even to have had -any communication with appellants upon the
subject of the sale it is not easy to
perceive.
Implied warranties arise by operation of law from facts pleaded. It
seems very much to us that it was the
theory of the pleader here to set up

an express warranty by the auctioneer, rather than to establish an implied warranty by the facts pleaded.
But, however that may be, we do not
think the facts sufficient in either
case. We conclude, therefore, that
the court committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to the answer."
The same court says in the opinion:
"The rule is that, where the sale is an
executed one, the buyer takes the
thing sold with all its defects, if there
be neither warranty nor fraud. And
the decided weight of authority is
also to the effect that a sale for a
sound price implies no warranty,
Parsons on Contract, 584, and note
(r). See also Postel v. Card, I Ind.
App. 252; Benjamine on Sales, Sec.
641, et seq; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law 133, et seq."
Since there w.as in fact no express
authority given to the auctioneer to
issue the warranty in question, and
there is by law no implied authority
to do so, the auctioneer acted without
authority, and such warranty is,
therefore, not binding upon the seller
of the horse, unless in fact he ratified
such warranty as appellants contend
he'did.
A lack of authority may, as in
other cases of agency, be supplied by
ratification. 3 Am. & Tng. Enc. of
Law 491; Montgomery v. Pacific
Coast Land Co., 94 Cal. 284, 28 Am.
St. Rep. 122. One of the conditions
upon which ratification depends is,
that the principal must have full
knowledge of the facts pertaining to
the unauthorized acts, so as expressly
or impliedly to assume full responsibility for them. Mecham on Agency,
Sec. 128; Wheeler v. Sleigh, 39 Fed.
347; Thacke v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291,
18 Am. Rep. 480; Cram v. Sickel, 51
Neb. 828, 71 N. W. 724, 66 Am. St.
Rep. 478; Am. Exc. Bank v. Loretta
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Mining Co., 165, Ill. 103, 46 N. E.
202, 56 Am. St. Rep. 233.
Upon the issue of ratification the
appellants had the burden of proof.
But the record preponderates strongly against them. Mr. Osborn, the seller, at no time, expressly ratified his
auctioneer's warranty. And there is
no evidence in the record showing
that he had any knowledge of such
warranty until the appellants plead
the same in this case. Nor is there
anything which charges him with
such knowledge. He specifically instructed his auctioneer not to warrant the horse, and he had a right to
rely upon his auctioneer's duty to
obey such instruction and to assume
that such instruction had been complied with. Mr. Osborn was not present at the sale, nor was he present
when the appellants gave their note
in settlement and received the auctioneer's warranty. When Mr. Osborn arrived home and received the
proceeds of his sale, including the
appellants' note, he knew nothing of
the warranty. True, Mr. Hill, the appellee, afterwards informed Mr. Osborn, when the latter sought to sell
him the note, that Mr. Green, the purchaser, had stated that the horse was
unsound and that he would return
him. But this is no information of
the warranty issued in violation of
his instructions. One cannot be held
to have ratified so material an act of
which he had at the time no knowledge. There is here no ratification.
Not infrequently the agent himself
becomes personally liable to the third
person for his unwarranted assumption of authority when the principal
is not bound. If without authority,
express or implied, from his principal
he warrants property, he is personally liable. Mecham on Agency 914;
3 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law 492;

Woodward v. Boter, 115 Mass. 81;
Dent v. McGrath, 3 Bush (By.) 174;
Schell v. Stephen, 50 Mo. 375; McGrew v. Forsythe, 31 Iowa 179; Sealing v. Knowleton, 94 Ill. App. 443.
Again an agent may make himself
personally liable when he executes
the contract in his own name and not
in the name of his principal. The
warranty in suit was executed by Mr.
Robinson in person, and not as agent
for Mr. Osborn, his principal. It was
not signed by Mr. Osborn, nor does it
appear to have been executed by the
auctioneer for and in behalf of Mr.
Osborn. It is this form of execution
of a contract that binds the agent
himself and not his principal. Holson
v. Hassett, 76 Cal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep.
193; Tilden v. Barnett, 43 Mich. 376,
38 Am. Rep. 197; Knickerbocker v.
Wilcox, 83 Mich. 200, 47 N. W. 123,
21 Am. St. Rep. 595; Stone v. Wood,
7 Cow. (N. Y.) 453, 17 Am. Dec. 529;
Dayton v. Warne, 43 N. J. L. 659;
Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. 464, 16
Am. Dec. 70.
The appellants having failed to
establish the warranty either by the
seller's authorization or ratification
thereof, and having plead no other
defence to the note, must fail in their
appeal. There is evidence in the
record to sustain the verdict of the
jury, and this court will not disturb
it on the mere weight of the evidence.
Duff as Pioneer Stock Powder Co. v.
Koontz, N. D. Law. Rep., Nov. 1920,
page 2.
Appellants allege as error for
which a new trial should be granted
the giving by the trial court of its
own motion the following instruction:
"The court instructs you that upon
these special defences the defendants
have the burden of proof, and to succeed thereon they must establish one
or the other of such defences by a
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preponderance of the evidence, and
upon thus establishing either of such
defences against the note in suit, the
verdict should be for the defendants."
This instruction, considered apart
from the other instructions (which
may not be done) may be complained
of only by the appellee, for it directs
the verdict for defendants merely if
warranty and breach are established,
and ignores the right of the appellee
to recover on the note as a bona fide
holder despite such warranty and
breach. But in no view of the case
might appellants have recovered the
verdict without having established by
a preponderance of the evidence this
special defence plead by them. Nor
would they have been entitled to the
additional instruction that the burden
of proof would shift to the plaintiff
as the holder of the note to prove that
he was a good faith purchaser of the
note for value and without notice of
the warranty and breach plead, if in
fact the appellants had not first established such warranty and breach.
The instruction given by the court is
correct and must be given to the jury
whenever confession and avoidance
plea is used by the defendant. Every
such plea must conclude with the prescribed common-law form, "and this
the said (defendant) is ready to
verify." Andrew's Stephens Pleading,
pg. 189; Phillips Code Pleading, pg.
57. The burden of proof is upon the
party alleging new matter. Andrew's
Stephens Pleading, pg. 219, sec. 12.
The appellants would have been entitled to an instruction to the effect
that, upon proof by them of the warranty and breach plead, the burden
shifted to appellee to prove that he
was a good faith holder of the note.
Winter v. Nobs (Idaho), 112 Pac.
525; Schulthiers v. Sellers, 223 Pa.
513, 72 Atl. 887; Parks v. Johnson

(Idaho), 119 Pac. 52; Robertson v.
U. S. Live Stock Co., 164 Iowa 230,
145 N. W. 535; Benson v. Conant et
al., 214 Mass. 127, 101 N. E. 60; In
re Hill, 187 Fed. 214. Having tendered no instruction in the form desired by them, they cannot be heard
to complain of the form, of instruction given by the court. But even if
the trial court had failed and refused
to give such instruction to the jury,
the error in this case would have
been harmless for the reason, as
shown, that appellants did not establish the warranty and breach, and the
appellee was therefore entitled to recover on the note whether he was a
good faith holder or not.
And for this reason it is also unnecessary to consider and determine
on-this appeal the issue so thoroughly
and admirably presented by counsel
both for appellants and appellee,
namely: that appellee was not a good
faith holder of the note, and therefore not entitled to recover thereon.
The judgment of the trial court
having been rendered for the appellant, Walker, on -his cross-complaint
as surety, he is relying upon the same
errors assigned as his co-appellant.
Having found no errors in the record
the judgment of the Notre Dame Circuit Court is in all things affirmed.
WASHBURN V. BLAKE
No. 8.
Replevin-Existing Trover JudgmentRes Adjudicata.
An unsatisfied judgment in trover does
not operate to pass title to the converted
property from the owner to the wrong-doer,
nor does it operate as a bar to a subsequent
action against such wrong-doer or a third
person who acquires the property from him.

Action in replevin by Henry Blake
against James Washburn. From a
judgment for plaintiff the defendant
appeals. Affirmed.
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Clyde A. Walsh and George D.
O'Brien for Appellant.
William S. Allen and Frank E.
Coughlin for Appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. By this action
in replevin Blake, the appellee-plaintiff, recoVered a judgment for the return of a steer from the appellant,
Washburn. The declaration is in one
count alleging the ownership and
right of possession in the plaintiff
and the wrongful taking and detention by the defendant. A plea was
filed containing counts of non cepit
and non detinet and former adjudication. To the latter plea plaintiff filed
replication of general issue. The
cause was tried by the court without
a jury, and the court found for the
plaintiff that he was the owner and
entitled to the immediate possession
of the steer described in the declaration, and to ten dollars damages for
its wrongful detention. Separate motions of the defendant for non suit, a
new trial, and in arrest of judgment
were overruled and proper exceptions
taken, all of which rulings are assigned as error on this appeal. Judgment was rendered on the finding
from which this appeal is taken.
Briefly stated the facts of the case
are that John Caldwell, while driving
a herd of his cattle past the farm of
the appellee, Blake, "picked up" and
drove off the steer in question, which
belonged to Blake. Afterwards the
appellant, Washburn, with knowledge
of the foregoing facts, bought the
steer from Caldwell, and now retains
it as his own. Before learning that
Caldwell had sold the steer to Washburn, Blake brought action in trover
against Caldwell, alleging conversion
and demanding $150 damages, the
value of the steer. Later, upon learning that Washburn had his steer,

Blake demanded it and brought this
action for its recovery. In the meantime a judgment in favor of the appellee, Blake, and against Caldwell
was rendered in the other case. The
latter judgment, however, remains
unsatisfied, and no execution has been
issued thereon.
It is this judgment in trover in
favor of Blake against Caldwell that
appellant, Washburn, pleads as res
adjudicata,in bar of Blake's present
action of replevin against him. Although this plea of former adjudication does not contain an allegation
that such judgment has been paid
and satisfied, yet the trial court overruled plaintiff's demurrer thereto,
holding, as a matter of law, that such
unsatisfied judgment itself was sufficient to bar plaintiff's recovery. But,
notwithstanding such judgment was
proven as plead, thereby constituting
a bar to plaintiff's right of recovery,
the trial court, contrary to its ruling
on the demurrer, rendered judgment
for the plaintiff. Either the ruling on
the demurrer was erroneous or the
finding and judgment are contrary to
law.
The sole question in this case is
whether or not a judgment in trover
for the value of property converted,
which judgment is unpaid and unsatisfied, of itself operates to transfer
title to the converted property to the
defendant so as to bar a subsequent
action by the plaintiff for its specific
recovery. There is much contrariety
of opinion in the decisions of the
courts upon this proposition, even
among the courts of the same jurisdictions. Appellant, to support his
contention that the judgment in
trover bars the appellant's right to
recover in this case, cites numerous
decisions from various jurisdictions,
and to sustain the contrary rule ap-
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pellee also cites many cases from the
same jurisdictions. After a careful
study and analysis of these decisions
and the rules deduced therefrom by
the text writers and other general
authorities, we are led to accept as a
correct general presentation of the
law, the statement found in 28 Am.
& Eng. Enc. of Law, (2nd Ed.) 738,
which is as follows: "There is conflict in the decisions with regard to
the effect of a recovery in trover uponl
the title to the chattels converted. In
the earlier cases the general rule was
announced that a recovery in trover
for the value of chattels converted
vested of itself the title of the plaintiff in the defendant, without regard
to a satisfaction of the judgment. In
the later decisions, however, the rule,
now generally recognized as the better doctrine, is that the mere recovery
of judgment in trover does not vest
in the defendant the title of the plaintiff, but the title is devested from the
plaintiff and vested in the defendant
only by a satisfaction of the judgment." (Cases are here collated).
Judge Phillips in his admirable
work on Code Pleading, page 94,
states the rule as follows: "Judgment for the value of the property
converted, in trover, as for property
carried away, in trespass, transfers
the title to the property to the defendant," citing in support thereof I
Chit. P1. 161, n. 2; Acheson v. Miller,
2 0. S. 203; 2 Kent Com. 387; 6
Wait's Ac. & Def. 224. Following
this statement of the rule is an admission that in some jurisdictions it
is held that title does not pass until
satisfaction of the judgment.
That Judge Phillips' deduction of
the rule as stated by him is erroneous
or unwarranted becomes obvious upon examination of his citations, all of
which, save one, support the contrary

rule. Chancellor Kent cautiously
states the rule thus: "On a recovery
by law in an action of trespass or
trover of the value of a specific chattel, of which the possession has been
acquired by tort, the title of the goods
is altered by the recovery, and is
transferred to the defendant." The
rule as here stated is that to transfer
title to the wrong-doer there must be
"a recovery . . . . of the value of
the specific chattel" and not merely
the recovery of a judgment for its
value. That satisfaction of such judgment must be made to effect the
transfer of title is clearly held by
Chancellor Kent, as shown by the remainder of his text on the subject,
to-wit: "The books either do not
agree, or do not speak with precision
on the point, whether the transfer
takes place in contemplation of law
upon the final judgment merely, or
whether the amount of the judgment
must first be actually paid or recovered by execution. In Brown v.
Wooten, (d) Fenner, J., said that in
case of trespass, after the judgment
given, the property of the goods is
changed, so that the former proprietor may not seize them again;
and in Adams v. Broughton, (a) the
K. B. declared that the property in
the goods was entirely altered by the
judgment obtained in trover, and the
damages recovered were the price
thereof. On the other hand, the rule
is stated in Jenkins (b) to be, that if
one person recovers damages in trespass against another for taking his
chattel, 'by the recovery and execution done thereon,' the property of
the chattel is vested in the trespasser;
and in the Touchstone (c) it is said
that if one recovers damages of a
trespasser for taking his goods, the
law gives him the property of the
goods 'because he hath paid for
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them.' The rule of the civil law was,
that when the wrongful possessor
of movable property, who was not in
a condition to restore it, had been
condemned in damages, and had paid
the same to the original proprietor,
he became possessed of the title. The
Roman and the French law speak of
the change of rights as depending
upon the payment of the estimated
value, (d). So, also, in the modern
case of Drake v. Mitchell, (e) Lord
Ellenborough observed that he always understood the principle of
transit in rem judicatam to relate
only to the-particular cause of action
in which the judgment was recovered,
operating as a change of remedy,
from its being of a higher nature
than before, and that a judgment recovered in any form of -action was
still but a security for the original
cause of action, until it was made
productive in satisfaction to the
party; and until then it would not
operate to change any other collateral
concurrent remedy which the party
might have. This (says Kent) is the
more reasonable, if not the most authoritative, conclusion on the question. (a) I."
In 6 Wait's Actions and Defences,
224, it is said: "A judgment in an
action of trover does not vest the
property in the chattel, unless it is
followed by satisfaction. (Brinsmead
v. Harrison, L. R., 6 C. P. 584; Osterhaut v. Roberts, 8 Cow. 43; Morris v.
Berkley, 2 Treadw. (S. C.) 228;
Spivey v. Morris, 18 Ala, 254; Hepburn v. Sewall, 5 H. & J. (Md.) 211;
Smith v. Alexander, 4 Sneed (Tenn.)
482; Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall, 1,
16) ; nor unless it is for the value of
the property. If damages are merely
nominal, it is treated as covering only
the damages for detention. Barb v.
Fish, 8 Blackf. 481. A judgment and

satisfaction is treated as equivalent
to a purchase of the goods by the
defendant, at the value assessed by
the jury (Brinsmead v. Harrison, L.
R., 6 C. P. 584), and it is upon this
principal that a verdict, not estimated
on the footing of the full value, does
not vest the property in the defendant. Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Ad.
After considering
& El. 511, n."
some early decisions of states which
have since overruled them and established the rule as stated by Wait, this
text writer continues: "Formerly, in
England, a judgment for the plaintiff was held to transfer the title in
the property to the defendant . . but
it is now held not to have that effect
until the judgment is satisfied, and
such seems to be the most sensible
rule. (Citing Lovejoy v. Murray and
Brinsmead v. Harrison, supra)."
The case of Acheson v. Miller, 2
Ohio S. 203, which Judge Phillips
cites as supporting his statement of
the rule, is given in the annotation to
28 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, (2nd
Ed.) 738, as supporting the contrary
doctrine. And, although the syllabus
of that case is misleading, the rule as
stated and applied to the decision of
the case by the court itself is as follows,: "Where a party, for an injury
to his property, elects to proceed by
an action of trespass or trover for its
value, the whole proceeding relates to
the time of the taking or conversion;
the controversy all relates to the
property as of that time; the criterion
of damages is the value of the property at the time of such taking or conversion. The party in effect abandons
his property, as of that time, to the
wrong-doer, and proceeds for its
value; so that, when judgment is obtained and satisfaction made, the
property is vested in the defendants,"
Chitty on Pleading is the only au-
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thority cited by Judge Phillips that
lends any support to his statement of
the rule that the mere judgment itself, rendered in trover or trespass,
transfers title to the wrong-doer.
Chitty's statement is so ancient that
it is founded on the early English
decisions. These, however, had been
overruled by the courts of England
and the United States Supreme Court
at the time of Judge Phillips' deduction, as shown by Kent and Wait
whom he cites as authority.
The generally accepted rule of today throughout the jurisdictions,
with but one or two exceptions, is,
that a judgment in trover or trespass,
without payment or satisfaction
thereof, does not pass title to the
property to the wrong-doer or bar a
subsequent action by the owner to recover such property or its value from
the one who has wrongfully seized or
converted it. In addition to the cases
and authorities,supra, see: Notes (a)
and 1 to Kent's Com. Vol. 2, pg. 389;
Note to Wooly v. Carter, 11 Am. Dec.
524; 38 Cyc. 2112; Cooley on Torts,
537; Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall, 1-18
Law Ed. 129; Atwater v. Tupper, 45
Conn. 144-29 Am. Rep. 674; Miller v.
Hyde, 161 Mass 472, 37 N. E. 310-25
L. R. A. 42, 42 Am. St. Rep. 424;
Spivey v. Morris, 18 Ala. 254-52 Am.
Dec. 224 and note; Prior v. Portsmough Cattle Co. (N. Mex.), 27 Pac.
327; United Society v. Underwood, 11
Bush (Ky.) 265-21 Am. Rep. 214;
Dow et al. v. King, 52 Ark. 282, 12
S. W. 737; John A. Tollman Co. v.
Wait, 119 Mich. 341, 78 N. W. 124;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Skillman, 52 N. J.
L. 263, 19 Atl. 260. Pennsylvania is
the only state which seems to adhere
to the contrary rule, as shown by the
fo'lowing cases cited by appellant:
Floyd v. Browne, 1 Rawle 121, 18

Am. Dec. 602; Marsh v. Pier, 4
Rawle 273, 26 Am. Dec. 131.
Many of the states whose early decisions are in confusion and conflict
have, in later cases, modified and
overruled such decisions, and emphatically proclaimed the better and prevailing rule. Thus, in John A. Tollman & Co. v. Wait, supra, the Supreme Court of Michigan clearly distinguishes the cases of Kenyon v.
Woodruff, 33 Mich. 310, and Brady v.
Whitney, 24 Mich. 154, relied upon
by the appellant, and declares in no
uncertain terms for the modern rule
as above stated. So, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in the case of
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Skillman, supra,
in a terse opinion, waives aside as
"rather loose intimations" of a "few
judicial expressions" "in some of the
cases of this court," and declares for
the modern rule as follows: "The single question for the consideration of
this court is whether a judgment in
trover, without satisfaction, passes
the title to the property converted to
the wrong-doer. The reasons are so
conclusive, and the decisions so numerous, in favor of the negation of this
proposition, that all discussion of the
subject seems to the court to be superfluous." The court then concludes
with a quotation frbm Justice Miller
of the U. S. Supreme Court taken
from the case of Lovejoy v. Murray,
supra, which follows: "In reference
to the doctrine that the judgment
alone vests the title of the property
converted in the defendant, we have
seen that it is not sustained by the
weight of authority in this country.
It is equally incapable of being maintained on principle."
We might venture our own opinion
that the rule contended for by the
appellant lacks both right reason and
justice, elements which Blackstone
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declares are the essentials of every
law. What reason is there for denying to the aggrieved party the fruits
of his right of action against a
wrong-doer for the tortious taking or
conversion of his property, by making the mere judgment, which such
wrong-doer may evade and never
satisfy, operate to defeat him in the
actual recovery of his property or its
value? and what justice is there in
this process, which not only legalizes
the wrong done, but actually transfers the title of such property from
its rightful owner to the tortfeazor,
and thus, by operation of law, forces
such tortfeazor to profit by his own
wrong.
A distinction, however, must be
made between judgments in trover
and trespass, ex delicto actions for
the wrong or tort, which do not bar
subsequent actions, and judgments in
assumpsit or the ex contractu actions, where the plaintiff waives his

right of action in tort and binds himself by the principle of the election of
remedies, to proceed in contract, for
the latter judgments do operate as a
bar. 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law
(2nd Ed.) 739. Some of the cases
cited by the appellant fall within this
rule.
Not only is an unsatisfied judgment in trover no bar to the prosecution of a subsequent action in tort
against the wrong-doer himself to recover the property taken or converted, but such action, as in appellant's
case, may be maintained against a
third party who acquires such property from the wrong-doer. Spivey v.
Morris, 18 Ala. 254, 52 Am. Dec. 224;
Dow et al. v. King, 52 Ark. 282, 12
S. W. 577.
There is no error in the record, and
the finding and judgment of the trial
court are sustained by the law and
the evidence. Judgment affirmed.
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BRIEF OF MAURICE F. SMITH IN CASE OF
GREEN ET. AL. vs. HILL.
State of Indiana
In the Supreme Court of Notre Dame
John Green and Daniel Walker,
Appellants
VS.
William Hill, Appellee
Brief for Applicants.
NATURE OF ACTION
This is an appeal brought by John
Green and Daniel Walker against the
appellee, William Hill, from a judgement rendered in favor of the appellee, in the Notre Dame Circuit
Court. The appellee as plaintiff
brought action on a note given by
the appellants to the appellee. The
jury decided in favor of plaintiffappellee in the sum of Two Hundred
and Twelve Dollars, ($212.00) principle and interest and the court accordingly entered judgement for the
amount stated in favor -of the plaintiff and against the defendants, from
which judgment the defendants prosecute their appeal to this court.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE.
The issues formed consisted of a
complaint in one paragraph on the
note. The defendant filed a separate
and several answer in four paragraphs; (1) general denial, (2)
breach of warranty, (3) fraudulent
transfer of the note to avoid defenses, (4) a special paragraph in
behalf of Daniel Walker alleging no
consideration for the suretyship.
The plaintiff filed a general demurrer ti the second, third, and
fourth paargraphs of the defendants
answer.
The plaintiff filed a general denial to the second and third paragraphs of the defendant's answer.

The defendant, Daniel Walker,
filed a cross-complaint in one paragraph, against the plaintiff William
Hill and the defendant, John Green,
praying that he be adjudged a surety
on the note.
The plaintiff William Hill filed a
general denial to the defendants
cross-complaint.
The defendant John Green also
filed a general denial to the crosscomplaint of Daniel Walker.
The trial was had by jury and
both parties submitted interrogatories.
The defendants filed a motion for
a new trial on the following grounds:
1. The verdict was contrary to the
law.
2. The verdict is contrary to the
evidence introduced.
S. The verdict is clearly against
the weights of evidence.
4. The court erred in giving of its
own motion, instructions numbered
four and eight.
5. The court erred in refusing to
give each of defendants instructions
numbered five, eight, nine, ten,
twelve, thirteen and fifteen.
HOW THE ISSUES WERE DECIIDED AND WHAT THE
JUDGMENT WAS
The jury which tried the case returned the following verdict:State of Indiana,
County of St. Joseph,
In the Notre Dame. Circuit Court,
September term, 1919.
William Hill
VS.
John Green and Daniel Walker.
Verdict.
We the jury find for the plaintiff
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and against the defendant John
Green as principal and against the
defendant Daniel Walker as surety
on the note in action and we assess
the plaintiff's damages in the sum of
Two Hundred and Twelve Dollars
($212.00).
Arthur B. Hunter,
Foreman
The plaitiff's general demurrer to
the defendant's second, third and
fourth paragraphs of answer was
overruled as to the second and third
paragraphs of answer and sustained
as to the fourth paragraph of answer.
The court ovreurled the defendant's separate and several motion for
a new trial, to which the defendants
separately excepted.
The court then entered the judgment in accordance with the verdict.
ERRORS RELIED ON FOR
REVERSAL
1. The verdict is contrary to law.
2. The verdict is contrary to the
,evidence.
3. The judgment appealed from is
not supported by sufficient evidence.
4. The court erred n overruling
the appellant's motion for a new
trial. •
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF
THE EVIDENCE
Samuel Obsorne residing on a
small farm situated near Healthwin
IIndiana disposed of his realty and
personalty at a public auction sale
held on July3, 1919. He secured the
services of Mr. Robinson, an auctioneer, and on the morning of July
3, Mr. Robinson reported at the farm
at which time he was given his instructions regarding the sale by the
,seller, Mr. Osborne. The auctioneer

was informed at this time that Mr.
Osborne would not be able to be present at the sale. He was also instructed to get as much out of the
sale as possible and while going over
the property to be sold mention was
made of a certain horse, the one for
which the note in action was afterwards given. Knowledge of the disease with which the animal was afauctioneer
the
reached
flicted
through Mr. Osborne, who after
mentioning the fact to the auctioneer,
told him to obtain as much as possible for the diseased horse.
At the request of Mr. Osborne the
plaintiff-appellee. Mr. Hill, assisted
the auctioneer in arranging and disposing of the goods billed for sale.
In effecting the sale of the defective
horse the auctioneer warranted him
to be "sound for wind and work,"
and after the animal had been paced
several times it was bid off and
"knocked down" to the defendant
Mr. Green for the fabulous sum of
$200.00. Mr. Hill was present at the
time of the bidding and settlement,
which was made after the sale. The
buyer, Mr. Green, signed the con-n
ditions of sale, and an express written warranty was attached to the
bill of sale. A promissory note was
presented in payment for the horse
and after it had been signed by the
defendant, Mr. Walker, as surety, it
was accepted.
The day following the sale, (July
4, 1919) Dr. De Coursey of South
Bend, Indiana, happened to be visiting the home of Mr. Green, in Roselawn, Indiana. Mr. Green mentioned
the purchase he had made the preceeding day and asked the licensed
veterinarian to examine the animal.
Upon examination the horse was
found to be afflicted with a disease
known as "lymhangitis," and immed-
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lately following this examination Mr.
Green went to Mr. Osborne's farm
to inform him of the defective condition of the animal. Not finding
Mr. Osborne he found Mr. Hill and
told him of the unsoundness of the
horse, also of his intention to return
him at once. The proceeds of the sale
were received by Mr. Osborne on his
return the evening of July 4, 1919,
at which time he also met Mr. Hill
and asked him if he would purchase
the not in question. It was at this
time that Mr. Hill told Mr. Osborne
that he had met Mr. Green that afternoon and learned of the unsoundness of the animal which was warranted to be sound. And after telling
him of Mr. Green's intention to rescind the sale he asked whether or
not he knew of the unsoundness of
the horse previous to the auction
sale. Mr. Osborne in answering stated
that the animal was perfectly sound,
for it appears ,he was over anxious
about disposing of the note. He even
said that he had the horse examined
several days prior to the sale, but
no evidence supporting the fact was
introduced. Mr. Hill, being rather
suspicious, did not purchase the note
till the following morning, when he
paid full falue for same ($200.00).
Being seriously ill for a week after
the sale Mr. Green unable to return
the animal to Mr. Osborne and demand the return of his note, but
upon recovery he did so promptly.
Mr. Osborne then refused to accept
the return of the horse stating that
he had sold the note and was no
longer a party to the transaction.
Mr. Green also went to Mr. Hill, the
holder of the note, and demanded its
return, but this demand was refused.
Mr. Green then took the horse back
home where he has kept and cared

for it ever since. It was useless to
him and he was willing to return it
at any time. When the note fell due,
Mr. Hill called at Mr. Green's store
and demanded payment of the appellant which was refused, and as a result of the refusal to make settlement
Mr. Hill brought action to recover on
the note.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I
The purchaser has a right to rely
on the representations made by an
auctioneer in effecting a sale, and
parties selling at auction will be held
to strict accountability for such representations.
Dowling vs. Lawrence. (Wis.) 16
N. W. 552.
Hugh v. Robertson. (Ky.) 15 Am.
Dec. 104,
Jeffrey v. Bigelow & Tracey. (N.
R.) 28 Am. Dec. 476.
Lynch v. Mercantile Trust Co. 18
Fed. 486.
II
The principal is bound as in any
other case of agency by the contracts
made by the auctioneer within the
scope of his authority. And to the
same extent as in other cases he is
affected b ythe representations -which
the auctioneer makes in order to effect a sale.
Mechem Sec. 294.
III
Special Agents. Though the authority of an agent be restricted by
instructions from the principal, the
latter will be bound by a warranty
attending a sale by the agent unless
the purchaser knew of such restriction.
Talmage v. Bierhauh, 103 Ind. 270,
Davis v. Talbot, Receiver, 137 Ind.
235.
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IV
Ratification by the principal of an
ultra vires act of his agent auctioneer makes him liable for such acts as
in other cases of agency.
Montgomery v Pac. C. Land Co. 28
Am. Rep. 122 Calif.
V
A holder in due course is a holder
who has faken the instrument under
(1) that
the following conditions:
it is complete and regular upon its
face, (2) that he became a holder of
it before it was overdue, and without
notice that it had been previously
dishonored if such was the fact, (3)
that he took it in good faith and for
value, (4) that at the time it was
negotiated to him he had no notice
of any infirmities or defects in the
instrument or defect in title of the
person negotiating it.
Art. IV Sec. 52 Uniform Negotiable Inst. Act.
Norton on Bills and Notes-414.

knowledge of the fact, and to which
the law attributes the same consequences as would be imputed to
knowledge.
Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence
-594.
Winter v. Nobs, Idaho, 112 Pac.
g25.
Vaughn v. Johnson, 119 Pac. 879.
Rublee v. Davis, 51 N. W. 135.
VII

Bad faith is the suspicion of the
existence of facts constituting the
equity or defect of title, followed by
a failure to make a reasonably thorough investigation to discover them
because offear of such discoveryor a failure on the part of the transferee to make a reasonably thorough
investigation to determine whether
or not a certain equity or defect in
title exists under such circumstances
as an ordinary person in the position
of such transferre would invariably
in the usual course of business sus.
yect that there was such a defect in
title.
VI
Googman v. Simonds, 15 L. Ed. 934
Union Nat. Bk. v Mailoux, 132 N.
To constitute notice of an infirmW. 168.
ity in the instrument or defect in
Jobes v. Wilson, 124 S. W. 548.
title of the person negotiating it, the
Norton-Bills and Notes-429.
person to whom it is negotiated must
VIII
have actual knowledge of the infirmity or the defect or knowledge of
Every person is deemed, prima
such facts that his action in taking facie to be holder in due course but
the instrument amounted to bad when it is shown that the title of
faith.
any person who has negotiated the
Art. IV Sec. 56. Uniform Negot. instrument is defective then the burInst. Act.
den of proof is on the holder, that
Notice is the information concern- is, to prove that he or the person
ing a fact, communicated to a arty under whom he claims acquired the
by an authorized person or actually title as a holder in d ue course.
Art. IV Sec. 59, Uniform Negot.
derived from him or by him from a
Inst. Act.
proper person, or else presumed by
Vaughn v. Johnson, 119 Pac. 879.
law to have been acquired by him,
Parks v. Johnson, 119 Pac. 52.
which information is regarded as
Robertson v. U. S. Live S. Co, 145
equivalent in its legal effects to full
N. W. 535.
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Benson v. Connant, 101 N. E. 60.
Kuhe v. Beehan, 82 Pac. 884.
In re Hill, et al., 187 Fed. 214.
Goodman v. Simonds, 15 L. Ed. 934
Union Nat. Bk. v. Mailoux, 132 N.
W. 168.
ARGUMENT

"get as much as possible" out of the
sale and he certainly acted in strict
accordance with his instructions. The
evidence brought out this fact very
clearly, that is, that the owner, Mr.
Osborne, had knowledge of the unsoundness and defective condition of
The real grounds upon which the the animal and even went as far as
defendants are basing this appeal to inform the auctioneer to that efare: (1) should a warranty given fect prior to the sale. But in utter,
at the time of an auction sale, by an disregard of the above mentioned
auctioneer, be valid and binding up- facts, the auctioneer warranted the
on the principal or holder of the horse, and as a result of these false
note, given in payment, with notice representations effected a sale obof the warranty and prior equities, taining the unreasonable price of
(2) If such warranty was not ord- $200.00 from an innocent purchaser.
inarily proper in the usual course of A similar situation existed in the
business, will subsequent ratification case of Jeffrey V. Bigelow, a New
of same make it binding and valid York case reported in 28 A. D. 476.
and what constitutes ratification. Here we have an agent authorized to
(3) What will constitute a holder in sell sheep. which he and his principal
due course. (4) Under what circum- knew to be unsound, and at the time
stances will bad faith be imputed, so of the sale he failed to disclose the
as to make an indorsee, taking be- facts to the purchaser. The ruling
fore maturity, a holder not in due of the court was:

course. (5) What will constitute
notice such as to make an indorsee
not a holder in due course. (6) After
showing that fraud was perpetrated
in the execution and negotiation of
the instrument, upon whom does the
burden of proof fall to show that
the indorsee or holder is not a holder
in due course.
The auctioneer in this case was
vested with the powers of special
and general agents, since he was
given the express authority of managing and selling all of the property
by the express words of the owner,
Mr. Osborne. And furthermore, the
absence of Mr. Osborne from the
sale gave the auctioneer numerous
additional powers which do not ordinarily vest in an auctioneer who is
considered as merely a special agent.
The essence of the express power
given was that the auctioneer should

"That the principal is liable for
his agent's failure to disclose to
a purchaser of sheep, which he
was authorized to sell, the fact
that they are diseased, where
that fact is known to the agent."
"That the principal is liable for
his agents failure to disclose to a
purchaser os sheep, which he was
authorized to sell, the fact that they
diseased, wher that fact is known to
the agent."
It is impossible to conceive of any
judicial tribunal that would not consider such a warranty binding upon
the vendor, for the acts of the auctioneer were fraudulent in every sense
of the word. The evidence which
tended to show that the warranty
was binding was so great that the
trial jury in answering plaintiffappellee's interrogatory, found that
the agent had authority to warrant
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the horse and consequently, such a
warranty must have been binding on
the vendor. In the case of Dowling
vs. Lawrence reported in 16N. W.
552, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held:
"If in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly allows the vendee to
be deceived, as to the thing sold, in
a material matter, his silence is
grossly fraudulent in a moral point
of view and surely may be treated accordingly in law tribunals."
There are numerous cases that
support our contention that the vefidor is bound to disclose such facts
that he knows the buyer will not be
able to find, and where such defects
are known to the seller and he goes
so far as to warrant an article
through his agent, who also knew of
the defects, how can such a warranty
be anything but binding-common
honesty and business intergrity in
such cases commands a man to speak
out.
Supposing at the time of the sale
that the warranty had not been valid
and binding would not Mr. Osborne's
acquiescence and acceptance of the
proceeds and benefits therefrom constitute ratification. This certainly
would amount to a ratification, for
the evidence pointed out very distinctly that Mr. Osborne realized that
the purchase price paid was greatly
in excess of the actual value of such
a useless animal, and still did not
attempt in any way to make reparation. The acceptance and transfer
of the instrument to the plaintiff Mr.
Hill must be construed as an acceptance and naturally a ratification of
the act of his agent.
Since we have produced sufficient
facts as will bar the original payee's
right to recover, we must show that
the plaintiff-appellee did not obtain

the note inder such circumstances as
would constitute him a holdre in due
course, and therefore, he possesses
no greater right of recovery than the
original payee and is bound by all of
the defenses and equities which the
maker of the note might have against
the original payee. Section 52 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act
provides as follows:
"A holder in due course is a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) that it is complete
and regular on its face, (2) that
,he became a holder of it before it
was overdue and without notice
that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact,
(3) that he took it in good faith
and for value, and (4) that at
the time it was negotiated to him
he had no notice of any infirmity
or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
In considering this section we can
readily see that the first two of the
necessary elements have been complied with by the holder of the note,
but as to the third and fourth the
contrary is true. The evidence tends
to show bad faith and actual notice
of defects in title of the person negotiating it, consequently it is ridiculous to consider Mr. Hill a holder
in due course. Norton defines bad
faith as follows:
"'Bad Faith' is a suspicion of
the existence of facts constituting the equity or defect in title,
followed by a failure to make a
reasonably thorough investigation to discover them, because of
a fear of such discovery."
Mr. Hill certainly must have harbored a suspicion as to the validity of
the instrument, for Mr. Green informed him on the day before he
purchased the note that there was a
failure of consideration on the part
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of Mr. Osborne in that the animal
was not as per the warranty made
by the auctioneer. Upon receiving
this information which must have
created a suspicion in his mind, he
merely made one single inquiry as
to the truth or falsity of the matter related by Mr. Green, and in making what he called a thorough investigation he went to Mr. Osborne who
Would naturally refute the statements
of Mr. Green since he was very anxious to rid himself of the note. Bad
faith could not be more evident than
it is in this particular case and
many cases are on record holding
bad faith on less positive evideiice.
Now, we must consider the fourth
essential necessary to constitute a
holder in due course and this essential
is notice. In Norton on Bills and
Notes the following may be found:
"Notice may be actual or constructive and bad faith means
not merely knowledge, but means
of knowledge to which the party
willfully shuts his eyes. In
equity jurisprudence notice may
be knowledge of any fact sufficient to put a prudent man upon
inquiry as to the existence of
some right or title in conflict
that he is about to purchase. It
is the duty of every purchaser
of property, if facts are brought
directly home to him such as
would put a reasonably prudent
man upon his guard to prosecute
an inquiry."
The Idaho Supreme Court in the
Winter vs. Nobs case which was
practically identical and analagous
to our case, rendered a decision in
favor of the maker of the note. Therefore, we contend that Mr. Hill could
not -have been a holder in due course,
because the information given him
from the mouth of Mr. Green regarding the defective condition of
the horse was nothing less than ac-

tual notice. The fact that he failed
to prosecute an inquiry that a reasonably prudent man would surely
have done under similiar circumstances, makes the presumption of bad
faith and actual notice too strong to
be overlooked.
The appellants sixth point need not
be discussed very thoroughly, for the
weight of authority is obviously in
their favor. On page 454 of Norton's
Bills and Notes the burden of proof
question is definitely decided:
"The holder of a bill or note,
is in the first instance, presumed to be a holder for value and
without notice; but, if it is proved on the trial that the bill or
note in its execution or negotiation was affected by fraud, it is
incumbent for the holder to
prove that he is a holder in due
course."
The following alone should be
sufficient to indicate that the trial
court erred in giving of its own
motion Instruction Number Four (4)
"The court instructs you that
upon these special defenses the
defendants have the burden of
proof and to succeed thereon,
they must establish one or the
other of such defenses by a preponderance of the evidence, and
upon thus establishing either of
such defenses against the note
in suit, the verdict should be for
the defendants."
Readily we notice that the court
should have further instructed the
jury to this effect, that upon showing the existence of a contract of
warranty and a breach thereof, the
burden of proof immediately shifts
upon the holder to satisfactorily
prove that he was a holder in due
course.
In considering the burden of proof
as to good faith of an indorsee on
a promissory note in the Schulthiers

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
vs. Sellers case (72 Atl. 887) the
Penna. Sup. Court held that the
holder of a promissory note required
to show the consideration paid, and
how it came into his hands, where
the defendant proved that it was put
into circulation fraudulently. It is
our firm belief that the above mentioned instruction was plainly erroneous and in the fact was the prime
cause of a verdict being returned
against the appellants herein. Unquestionably, such an error in the
lower court is a sufficient sause for
a reversal and judgment in favor of
the appellants. A few more cases in
support of our contention may be
cited:
Parks v. Johnson, Idaho, 119 Pac.
52.
Robertson v. U. S. Live Stock Co.,
Iowa 145 N. W. 535.
Benson v. Conant et al. Mass., 101
N. E. 60.
In re Hill et al., 187 Fed. 214.

In concluding, the appellants believe that they are entitled to a judgment in their favor and a reversal of
the judgment of the trial court n
the following two grounds: (1) that
the appellee was not a holder in due
course, thereby making a recovery as
against the breach of warranty an
impossibilty, and (2) that the court
erred in its failure to instruct the
jury that the burden of proof was
on the holder in due course where it
was shown that the instrument had
been fraudulently executed and negotiated. Consequently, our precise
contention is that the trial court
erred grossly in overrulnig the appellants motion for a new trial.
We respectfully submit that for
the errors which we believe we have
clearly indicated in this brief, the
judgment of the court below should
in all things be reversed.
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BRIEF OF RALPH W. BERGMAN IN CASE OF
GREEN ET. AL. vs. HILL.
State of Indiana
In the Supheme Court of Notre Dame
John Green and Daniel Walker,
Appellants
VS.
William Hill, Appellee

morning of that day, Mr. Osborne instructed Mr. Robinson as to the details of conducting the sale-the
various articles to be sold-and especially did Mr. Osborne instruct the
auctioneer concerning the horse, for
which the note in question was given.
Brief for Appellee.
As the appellants admit, Mr. Osborne
Appeal from the Notre Dame Cir- told on that occasion of the unsoundcuit Court.
ness of the horse, and mentioned that
RECORD
it seemed to be afflicted with "lymThe Appellant counsel's report of phangitis", but told him to get as
the evidence is substantially correct. much out of it as possible. Mr. Osborne and the auctioneer, on the
EVIDENCE
witness stand, both testified tl-at Mr.
The statement of the evidence as Osborne in terse and emphatic langset out in the appellant's brief is uage directed and cautioned the
conditionally true. We find that what auctioneer that in the event the horse
is said is true but he does not state was sold, not to warrant him; and
all that was said, and does not com- under no condition to warrant him
plete the sentences as uttered by the because the horse was "not sound".
witnesses themselves, and as also
The horse was "put up" for aucrecorded by the clerk. A reference to tion and in due course sold and "bid
the court's records will disclose and off' to the highest bidder, who was
substantiate this affirmation.
the appellant, Mr. Green, for the
Such an abridged statement is a sum and consideration of $200. Mr.
very dangerous thing, as its inev- Green was reluctant about buying
itable consequences is deception. A this horse and the auctioner hearhalf reiteration is more illusive than ing that Mr. Green would not buy
a complete misstatement. Such cun- unless the horse was warranted,
ning briefing of facts and evidence promised and did give Mr. Green the
much be abolished and it is my duty, warrant. The auctioneer stated that
to the furtherance of justice and he did this because it would increase
righteousness, to so point them out his commission. His exact words
to the learned court.
were: "The more goods I sold, the
Mr. Osborne owned a farm and more would be my commission". As
considerable personal property near the appellants contend, the auctioneer
Healthwin, Indiana. Wishing to re- warranted the horse "sound for wind
tire, he offered at auction the per- and work". This was defendant's
sonal property on the farm. This sale exhibit Numbed 2. The warranty and
was, as advertised, held at his farm bill of sale was then given to Mr.
on the date of July 3, 1919.
The Hill. It is to be remembered that the
services of Mr. Robinson an auction- above bill of sale and warranty was
eer were contracted for. On the signed by Mr. Robinson, the auction-
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eer, and not by Mr. Obsorne. We
will show later that this is an important fact. The note in question
was then given, having been signed
by Mr. Green as principal, and Mr.
Walker as surety.
Mr. Osborne was unexpectedly and
unavoidably called to Chicago, due to
the expected death of his mother.
For this humanitarian reason he was
unable to be present and attend the
sale.
The horse was examined by a man
named Dr. De Courcey. Dr. De Courcey, by the evidence, was taking
dinner with Mr. Green and Mr.
Green -informed him of a purchase
of a horse the other day and asked
the doctor to "look him over." Such
examination was merely a visual inspection, as was testified to by both
the doctor and Mr. Green.
The doctor was a licensed veterinary. The appellants in their brief,
say "The horse was found to be afflicted with lymphangitis." The doctor said "It appeared to be affected
with such disease." The record will
sustain this statement. This is a
question of little importance to our
case. Though the appellants seem to
lay great stress upon it. The more
they enlarge the noticability of the
disease, the more they cast upon the
appellant himself, his culpable, careless and indifferent purchase.
Mr. Hill took the stand and told
the court and jury that he had been
at Healthwin since the first of January 1918, and had known Mr. Osborne personally all this time, and
had in fact spent most of his time in
conversing with Mr. Osborne. Time
lagged for Mr. Hill, and he made
this pleasurable and sincere acquaintance. Mr. Hlil was a soldier and had
been gassed in the world war. He

knew Mr. Osborne very well and respected him highly.
The appellants allege the presence
not distinguish between mental presence and mere physical presence. Mr.
Hill told the court that he was not
paid for the little ministerial duties
he performed, saying in substance,
"My object was merely to return
past favors that Mr. Osborne had
done for me." Nor did he assert at
any time that he knew of the condition of the live-stock on the farm.
When asked this question direct he
replied: "I knew nothing of their
condition." He stated he did not know
that the horse for which the note was
given was, as alleged, defective;
stating that such suspicion came to
him only on the day following the
sale. Also stating that when Mr. Osborne asked him (Mr. Hill) to buy
the note, he told of the information
-received from Mr. Green. Mr. Osborne emphatically and forecibly denied this disease and assured him of
the horse's health because, as he
stated, it was just examined by Dr.
O'Hara. Having been such personal
friends for a year and a half, Mr.
Hill had a right to accept that statement in good faith; also having met
and known Mr. Green but once.
TMr. Osborne wished to discount the
note because the auctioneer was there
and asking for his commission money.
The next day, July 5, 1919, Mr.
Hill brought the note, paying Mr.
Osborne the sum and consideration
of $200.
The reason which Mr. Green gives
for not returning the horse at the
proper time if he thought it defective,
is that he was sick and unable to do
so: with which excuse he hopes to
absolve himself from the legal obli-
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gation to return or offer to return.
such goods.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
A, special agent is one authorized
to act only in a articular event and
in accordance with specified instructions.
Mechemon Agency. Art. 14.
Page 12.
II
It is ordinarily not only the right,
but the duty of the agent to observe
and comply with such valid and established customs and usages as apply to the subject matter or the performance of his agency. Such customs
and usages, however, cannot, as between the principal and the agent,
overrule positive instructions to the
contrary.
Wanless vs. McCandless, 38 Iowa
20.
Osborn vs. Rider, 62 Wis. 235.
III
When an auctioneer exceeds the
scope of his authority he does not
bind the owner of the property.
Bush vs. Cole, 28 New Aork, 261.
Court vs. Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440.
IV
A warranty given in an auction
sale is valid and binding if such
warranty is within the scope of the
authority of the agent so giving it.
2 Ruling Case Law. 470.
Bush vs. Cole, 28 N. Y. 261.
Upton vs. Suffield County Mills, 59
Am. Dec. 163.
V.
Bad faith means nothing more than
participation in the fraud and resolves itself into the question of
honesty or dishonesty, for guilty
knowledge and wilful ignorance,
alike, involve the result of Bad Faith.

Murray vs. Lardner, 17 Law. Ed.
857.
Richmond Trading & Mfg. Co.
vs. Farquar, 8 Flk. 89.
VI.
It is now the rule of the Law Merchant that mere knowledge of any
facts sufficient to put a reasonably
prudent man on inquiry is not sufficient, but that to defeat his claim to
be considered a bona fide holder he
must be guilty of Bad Faith.
Arndt vs. Aylesworth, 145 Ia. 185.
Hakes vs. Thayer, 165 Mich. 476.
Reeves & Son vs. Letts, 143 Mo.
App. 196.
Ketchem vs. Govin, 71 N. Y. Supp.
991.
Rice vs. Barrington, 70 Atl.. 169.
Dorsey vs. Wellman, 122 N. W.
989.
VII
Actual bad faith is a suspicion of
the existence of facts constitnting
the equity or defect in title, followed
by a failure to make a reasonably
thorough investigation to disrlose
them because of the feas of such discovery.
ARGUMENT
There are certain underlying principles which the appellants have ignored. (1st) The authority to issue
the warrant. (2nd) The auctioneer
exceeding the scope of his authority,
or was warranting done in obedience
to the commands and instructions of
the principal, Mr. Osborne. (3rd)
The signatures on the warranty.
(4th) Did not Mr. Green, as appellants argue, return the horse a week
after the sale and four days after the
sale of the note. (5th) How much
and what purity of circumstances are
necessary before a man can be
charged with bad faith. (6th) Did
the auctioneer because of personal
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gain, commit the fraud, if such was
committed, by resorting even to a
written warranty to increase and
swell his cofmission. (7th) No evidence to show that Mr. Osborne had
cognizance of the fact that the horse
was to be returned until four days
after the sale of the note. (8th) Did
Mr. Green, upon learning from Dr.
DeCourcey that the horse appeared
to be affected with "Lymphangitis,"
rescind and notify Mr. Osborne as
soon as possible. No. He waited five
days before he notified him, and
after the sale of the note.
We will remember from the evidence of the forcible language used
by Mr. Osborne to Mr. Robinson concerning the condition of the horse
and regarding the warranty thereof,
and we can see that the warranty
was not within the scope of the auctioneer's authority, nor was it signed
by the principal in order to ratify
this act, nor was such ever ratified
by the principal. There was no evidence to show that Mr. Osborne even
knew that the horse was sold, nor
was it shown that Mr. Osborne knew
that Mr. Green bought the horse.
Nor did he know that the note in
question was given as consideration
for this horse. And under these considerations, how could he have ratified the unauthorized act of the agent! Knowledge is an essential element of ratification. How could a
man ratify an act when he did not
know of the act. Consequently under,
these conditions and the law of simple contracts, those whose names
appear upon the contract are prima
facie liable thereon. The agent here
is not a general agent, but the law
tells us he is a special agent, and as
such this special agent, and not the
principal, is liable on the warranty

question. Since breach of warranty
is a personal defense and available
to the parties to it, the defense should
not be applicable to a third person,
who was not a party to such warranty. The appellants see into lay much
stress upon ratification, and to establish this they hope to have the case
reversed. The case in question does
not deal with the fraud of Mr. Osborne in selling a defective instrument: our duty rests upon showing
that Mr. Hlil was a good-faith purchaser, and for a valuable consideration. No matter if Mr. Osborne did
deceive both Mr. Green and Mr. Hill
in his representations, if Mr. Hill,
according to the law, was a holder
in due course, in good faith and for
a aluable consideration, he can recover on the instrument.
We have a case decided in this
the sane circumstances, and these
operative facts and the evidence in
this cited case are not half as strong
as in this case and yet the court decided a swe pray the court will in
this case sustain the verdict.
Court vs. Snyder, 2 Ind. Appellate
440.
A mare was sold at auction. It
was diseased at the time of sale. The
disease could not have been discovered at the time of the sale because.
of its internal location. The plain-.
tiffs knew of this disease and :,purposely concealed the same from Ithe
Defendants. The auctioneer was not
instructed by the principal not to
warrant. In our case the honesty and
fairness of the principal drove him
to emphatically warn the auctioneer
"not to warrant": also the auctioneer did warrant.
The holding of the court in this
case was:
st-In executed sales, the buyer
takes the thing sold with all de-

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
fects, if there is neither warranty nor fraud.
2nd-A sale for a sound price
implies no warranty of soundness.
3d-Without wilfull misrepresentation or artful devise the
character or concealed defects in
a thing sold, the vendee is bound
by the contract even though the
vendor gets a decided advantage
and puts off on the vendee a defective article.
4th-That the seller is aware of
a latent defect in an animal sold
does not amount to fraud unless
he makes some statement or uses
some act or devise calculated to
deceive the buyer, or to induce
him not to make inquiry.
5th-A seller is not bound by express warranties made by an
auctioneer or other special agent
unless he has especially authorized such warranty.
6th-In executed sales, without
express warranty, no warranty
is implied.
Now, Learned Justices of the Supreme Court, let us look to the question of bad faith and see what the
modern law deems necessary to constitute bad faith and which will prevent the decision from being sustained.
Allow me to quote from Parsons
on Contracts. Page 577-8.
I becomes, therefore, important to
know what the law means by fraud
in this respect, and what it recogprenizes as such fraud as will prevent
the application of the general rule.
The weight of authority requires that
this should be active fraud.
The
Common Law does not oblige a seller
to disclose all that he knows which
lessens the value of the property he
would sell. He may be silent, leaving
the purchaser to inquire and examine
for himself o rto require a warranty.
Beninger vs. Corwin 24 N J L 257
The Court said:

Where there is no wilful misrepresentation or artful devise to
disguise the character or conceal
the defects of the thing sold, the
vendee is found by contract even
though the vendor got a decided
advantage in the trade and put
off on the vendee a defective
article, such as an unsound
horse.
The Richmond Trading & Mfg. Co.
vs. Farquar. 8 Blackford 89.
Again in this Indiana case the
court held: It is well settled, we
think, that a vendor cannot even
by express warranty made by an
auctioneer or other special agent,
unless he has specially authorized such warranty, bind the principal.
Bush vs. Cole. 28 New York 261.
The Coure found as follows:
Where the-auctioneer is instructed not to sell property under a
specific sum, and sells it for less,
and the owner refuses to convey
it on that account, the auctioneer
is liable and not the principal.
131 American State Reports 483.
As to matters on which the express terms of his agency are silent, his authority is to be measured by the general usages of
business. Thus an express warranty made by an auctioneer
does not bind the seller, unless
he has specifically authorized the
auctioneer to make. it, for a mere
agency to sell does not carry
with it by implication, power to
warrant.
Let us take the case that is cited
by the appellants and upon which
they lay great stress. Winter vs,
Nobs. 112 Pac. 525. The language of
the court on innocent purchasers and
bona fida pucrhasers, and it might
be well to say that this is a very similiar case, but differs in the express
warning given by the auctioneer.
And the method of notice to Hill. We
find in this previous case of the ap-
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pellant's the following decision of the
court:
"Mere suspicious circumstances
are not sufficient to charge the purchaser of a promissory note with bad
faith and notice of equities and defenses. The rights of the holder are
to be determined by the simple test
of honesty and good faith, and not
by speculative issues as to diligence
or negligence."

what Mr. Hill thought of Mr. Green,
not knowing him.
Let us now look at the language of
the decision in the case of Gray vs.
Boyle. 104 Pacific 829. This was
taken Crawfords Annotated Negotiable Instruments Law.
The holder is not bound at his
peril to be on the alert for circumstances which might possibly
excite the suspicion of wary vigilance. He does not owe to the
party who puts the paper afloat,
the duty of active inquiry in order to avert the imputation of
bad faith. The rights of the
holder are to be determined by
the simple test of honesty and
good faith and not by a
speculative issue as to his diligence and negligence.
The
holders' right cannot be defeated
without proof of actual notice of
the defect on title or bad faith
on his part evidenced by circumstances. Though he may have
been negligent in taking the paper, and omitted precautions
which a prudent man would have
taken, nevertheless unless he
acted mala fides, his title according to settled doctrines will prevail.
Richards vs. Monroe. 85 IoIwa 357.
The Court said:

As the evidence showed, Mr. Hill
certainly, if nothing else, was sincere and honest and diligent in the
purchase of this note. He believed
Mr. Osborne who was a good friend,
long standing, at no time had Mr. Hill
ever doubted or had reason to doubt
Mr. Osborne's intergrity for truthfulness. He only bought the note
when pbsitively assured by Mr. Osborne, his personal friend, that the
horse was sound and assured that
Dr. O'Hara had just examined him.
Isn't it most natural and conclusive
to the condition of a thing, to inquire
of the man who- would most naturally know that condition? And who
would be a better man to inquire of
the condition of this horse than Mr.
Osborne, the man who owned and
possessed the horse, and who, because
The rule that when a purchaser of a negotiable promissory
of these things would be the most
note for value, before due, has
authorative person to interrogate on
such knowledge or information
this hypothesis. And above this,
of infirmities in the note as
wouldn't the decision or statement of
would put a man of ordinary
a personal friend be satisfactory
prudence upon inquiry to ascertain the truth of the matter, he
proof and relieve the doubt in an
will be held to have had notice.
ordinary person's mind. If everyone
was a liar and no man's word could
Mr. Hill did act as a prudent man
be given weight, then we could see and would not buy the note the day,
how
the
appellants'
contention Mr. Osborne offered it to him. His
should be sustained. By what rule of worde were these: "I will not buy
human nature and conduct should the note. Mr. Greentold me that he
Mr. Hill disbelieve Mr. Osborne and wa sgoing to bring that horse back;
believe the words of Mr. Green whom it is unsound." To which Mr. Oshe had met but once. We cannot say borne replied;" The horse is sound
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because I just had it examined the
day before the sale by Dr. O'Hara."
Mr. Hill even did not buy the note
but waited until the next day after
having thought the matter over. Undoubtedly he weighed the matter and
thought of the circumstances and
reached the honest conclusion that
the words of Mr. Osborne were true.
Certainly, Mr. Hill cannot be guilty
of bad faith in purchasing the note.
The note was not bought at a startling discount, but on the contrary
the full face value was given. Which
shows that there was no intention
of profit or gain in the transaction.
And would again show his good faith
in purchasing the instrument.
Let me again call your attention to
another Iowa case.
Lehmna vs. Press. 76 N W 818.
"The fact that the plaintiff was
merely put on suspicion or was careless in not making inquiry, is not
sufficient. He must be shown, by
direct or circumstantial evidence to
have taken the paper with knowledge
or notice of its infirmities or circumstances must be such as to indicate
wilful negligence to inquire, or such
gross carelessness in failing to do so
when inquiry would have led to such
knowledge as shall establish bad
faith."
Regarding the appellants' sitxh
point, as to the burden of proof. Let
me call the Learned Court's attention to the pleadings in this case.
The record will show that the appel-

lant filed by way of answer: 1. General denial. 2. Breach of Warranty.
3. Fraudulent transfer of the note to
avoid defenses. 4. A special para-,
graph in behalf of the surety. We
are concerned with 2 and 3. These
are by way of confession and avoidance. It is a sacred rule of pleadings,
"He who alleges must prove." It
was their duty show these special
defenses asthe trial court rightfully
instructed.
We find from the decisions of
other cases that definitions of Bad
Faith and Good Faith are impossible to give. 1st. Because the facts
involved are so different and varied.
2nd. Because good faith or bad faith
involve a mental condition. These
must be decided by, and depend upon
many circumstances, such as, the
demeanor of the witness, the consistency of the statements, his appearance in the court room, and the general scrutiny of the parties. The
jury has, I venture to say, the best
opportunity to observe these and
answer the interrogatories accordingly and allow for same in the verdict which they return. The appellee
prays that the Supreme Court will
accordingly consider the question of
good faith and give it consideration
based upon the trial court's finding
of good faith.
We respectfully submit this brief
and beg that the judgment of the
Lower Court be in all things affirmed.
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CAUSE NO. 18.
Charles Dressler
VS.
Nellie Cranford and
Walter Cranford
Archibald Duncan and
Alden J. Cusick,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
James L. O'Toole and
Joseph L. Rafter,
Attorneys for Defendants.
FACTS.

CIRCUIT

COURT

curred costs and expenses of physician, surgeon and nurse; that he suffered bodily and mental pain; that he
is permanently injured in this: that
his hand and forearm are left stiff or
rather inflexbile to a degree making
use of them awkward and difficult.
He demands $1,000. Plaintiff alleges
that Nellie Cranford was in the presence of her husband, Walter Cranford, and fired the shot with his
knowledge and consent. Walter Cranford was in the Rater home at the
time of the shooting, but his exact
location is in dispute.
Defendants contend that the crowd
had been ordered off the premises by
Mr. Rater; that the crowd remained
and continued their serenade of the
defendants; that plaintiff at the time
he was shot had raised the window of
the bed room in which Nellie Cranford and her little four-year-old niece
were hiding; Nellie Cranford alleges
that she shot in self-defence and in
defence of her niece. Plaintiff denies
that he pushed his gun through the
window at any time, as alleged by
Nellie Cranford.
Walter Cranford claims to have
been in another part of the house at
the time of the shooting, and denies
having knowledge of or giving consent to the shooting.

On August 1, 1920, Nellie Cranford
and Walter Cranford were married.
While spending their honeymoon at
the country home of Nellie Cranford's father, Andrew Rater, the
plaintiff and divers other persons,
men, women and children of the
neighborhood, came to the Rater
home for a charivari party on the
defendants. Guns were fired in the
air, bells were rung, cans dinned, etc.,
(bedlam noises). Rough house tactics ensued when the defendants refused to "come out" and "come
across."
Plaintiff contends that, as he stood
in the yard near the house, the defendant, Nellie Cranford, stuck the
barrel of a shotgun out the bed room
window and fired, the shot striking
TRIAL RECORD.
him in the hand and forearm, breaking the arm and badly lacerating the
Plaintiff files complaint that Nellie
hand and forearm; that he was at the
perpetrattime and ever since a farmer of mod- Cranford injured him by
upon him,
battery
and
assault
an
ing
erate means and compelled to depend
direction
the
at
and
of
presence
the
in
upon his work on the farm for a liveCranford.
lihood for himself and family of wife of her husband, Walter
to strike out
motion
file
Defendants
and small children; that he was renwhich
complaint,
of
parts
certain
dered sick and unable to perform his
sustained.
is
motion
work for a period of two months; in-
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Plaintiff files amended complaint in
two paragraphs.
Defendants file separate and several demurrer to complaint, which
the court overrules, defendants separately and severally excepting to the
rulings.
Defendants file answer in four
paragraphs, 1st, general denial, 2nd,
son assault demesne, 3rd, defence of
property, and 4th, plaintiff engaged
in unlawful act, charavari.
Plaintiff files reply in general denial to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th paragraphs of answer.
Jury empannelled, and cause submitted and tried.
Plaintiff and defendants tender
certain instructions, some of which
are given and some refused, to which
rulings they take their respective exceptions.
Arguments by counsel after which
the cburt instructs the jury in writing, ordering the instructions filed
and made part of the record without
bill of exceptions.
Jury return verdict for plaintiff
against both defendants for $1,000.
Defendants file separate motions
for new trial which are overruled and
exceptions taken.
Defendants separate motions in
arrest of judgment overruled to
which rulings they except.
Judgment rendered on the verdict
to which defendants separately take
exception.
Defendants pray appeal to the Supreme Court of Notre Dame which is
granted upon the filing of appeal
bond in the sum of $500 with the
Great Northern Surety Company as
surety. Ten days are given in which
to file general bill of exceptions.
Defendants file the appeal bond
prescribed and approved.

CAUSE NO. 19.
John Wagner
VS.
Nathan Parker
Charles P. J. Mooney and
Gerald Craugh,
Attorneys for Appellant
Walter A. Rice and
Charles M. Dunn,
Attorneys for Appellants.
FACTS.
On the 1st day of August, 1920,
Nathan Parker owned a retail
grocery store consisting of stock and
fixtures, located in a ground-floor
and
room on the corner of
streets in the city of Niles,
Michigan. John Wagner owned an
equity in a certain tract of land, towit: a contract for the purchase of
(Here insert legal description of any
forty-acre tract of land in St. Joseph
County, Indiana). Parker and Wagner reside in South Bend, Indiana,
and, on the first day of August, 1920,
entered into the following written
contract for the sale and exchange of
their said properties, to-wit:
"Contract of Sale and Exchange."
This agreement, made and executed this 1st day of August, 1920, at
between
Indiana,
South Bend,
Nathan Parker, party of the first
part, and John Wagner, party of the
second part, WITNESSETH: That,
that the party of the first part does
hereby sell, assign, transfer, exchange, set over and deliver unto the
party of the second part his grocery
store consisting of stock and fixtures
located on the ground-floor room of
the building, on the corner of
streets, in Niles, Michiand
gan, said grocery store and its con-
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tents being more particularly described in the inventory thereof just
completed which is hereto attached,
referred to and made part of this instrument. And the said party of the
first part, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, does covenant and agree to warrant the sale of
said property and the title thereof to
the said party of the second part, his
heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns; and agrees to pay all debts
against said property and said party
of the first part on account thereof,
up to the day, which debts now
amount to about $1000. In consideration of which, the party of the second
part does hereby sell, assign, transfer
and deliver over to the party of the
first part, all his right, title and interest in a certain tract of land situated in St. Joseph County, Indiana,
as evidenced by the contract of purchase held by the said party of the
second part and this day assigned and
delivered by written assignment endorsed thereon, signed, sealed and
acknowledged and delivered by the
said second party unto the party of
the first part, which said contract together with said assignment endorsed
thereon is attached hereto referred to
and made part of this instrument.
And as a further consideration the
party of the second part hereby executes and delivers to the party of the
first part his promissory note, of this
date, for $400, payable in one year,
with interest at 6 per cent per annum
from date, and attorneys fees, which
note is hereby referred to, attached
to this instrument and made part
thereof.
Executed in duplicate by the parties this 1st day of August, 1920, at
South Bend, Indiana, each party retaining a copy as the original contract.

(Signed) Nathan Parker,
(Signed) John Wagner.
Pursuant to the foregoing instrument John Wagner, after delivering
the assigned contract and promissory
note, went into possession of the store
at Niles, Michigan.
In Michigan the Bulk Sales Law
was in force but was entirely ignored by the parties in their contract, no
attempt at compliance with its provisions -being made by the parties.
After going into possession of the
store, the National Grocery Company,
the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company and the South Bend Wholesale
Grocery Company, as creditors having claims against the first party to
the contract, Nathan Parker, brought
action in the Michigan Court under
the Bulk Sales Law and took possession of the stock, placed it in the
hands of a Receiver and sold the entire stock and fixtures to satisfy the
claims of the creditors, these claims
aggregating $1100.
Parker and
Wagner were made defendants to
this proceeding in the Michigan
court. Parker has paid no part of
these claims.
Plaintiff brings action in the Notre
Dame Circuit Court against Parker
to secure the reassignment of the
land contract back to him, and the
cancellation of the note given to
Parker under the contract.
TRIAL RECORD
Plaintiff files complaint in one
paragraph for recission of assignment of his land contract and for
cancellation of his note on ground of
total failure of consideration.
Defendant files answer in two
paragraphs, 1st, general denial and
2nd, that contract between parties is
illegal and that both parties are in
par delicto.
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Plaintiff files demurrer to the 2nd
paragraph of answer which is sustained.
Defendant files amended 2nd paragraph of answer, to which plaintiff
iles demurrer, court overruling demurrer and plaintiff taking exception.
Plaintiff files reply in two paragraphs to the amended 2nd paragraph of answer, 1st, general denial,
2nd, fraud of defendant.
Defendant files demurrer to 2nd
paragraph of reply on ground of departure. Court sustains the demurrer to which plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files amended 2nd paragraph of reply, and an additional
paragraph alleging facts in confession and avoidance.
Defendant files motion to strike out
the 3rd paragraph of reply, which
court overrules and to which ruling
defendant excepts.
Defendant files several demurrer
to the amended 2nd and the 3rd paragraphs of reply. Court sustains demurrer to the amended 2nd paragraph of reply to which plaintiff excepts, and overrules demurrer to the
3rd paragraph, to which defendant
excepts.

Defendant files general denial to
the 3rd paragraph of answer.
Cause is submitted to the court for
trial.
At close of plaintiff's case in chief,
defendant moves for non suit, which
is overruled, defendant taking exception.
Trial is concluded and arguments
of counsel heard.
Finding for defendant that plaintiff take nothing by his suit and that
defendant recover his costs.
Plaintiff files motion and causes
for a new trial, which motion is overruled by the court, plaintiff excepting.
Plaintiff files motion in arrest o7
judgment which also is overruled and
exception to the ruling taken.
Judgment rendered on the finding
to which plaintiff takes his exception.
Plaintiff prays appeal to the Supreme Court of Notre Dame which is
granted, plainting filing his appeal
bond in the sum of $200 with Globe
Surety Company as surety, which
bond is approved. Ten days are given in which to file general bill of exceptions.
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JUNIOR MOOT

COURT

CAUSE NO. 1

Who should recover in the action?

Charles Dunn
VS.
Maud Thomas

James F. Murtaugh and
Alfonso A. Scott,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rose Kramer and Maud Penny,
aged respectively 22 and 20 years,
resided in South Bend, Indiana, and
had been intimate friends for years.
Rose was an orphan without brothers
or sisters while Maud had parents
and a brother living.
Because Maud had better means;
of getting information, Rose requested generally of Maud that she give
her such information as she might
get at any time about any young men
of the town who might seek Rose's
company. Two years later Maud was
married to John Thomas, and the
girls at that time became estranged
and were no longer companions.
A year after Maud's marriage,
Rose met for the first time Charles
Dunn, a young lawyer of South Bend,
to whom she became engaged. Maud
Thomas, upon learning of the engagement wrote to Rose in a letter addressed to her that "Charles Dunn
bore an unsavory reputation, was
said to be addicted to drinking and
gambling and had other bad habits."
Rose received the letter while Charles
Dunn was calling on her, and in his
presence read the letter and then
gave it to him to read.
After his marriage to Rose, Dunn
brought action against Maud Thomas
for libel. Maud Thomas avers that
she acted only on Rose's request,
without malice and in good faith on
some information she had gained.
The information was not reliable and
the facts stated in the letter were untrue.

Plaintiff claims that he should recover damages in as much as the libelous matter accused him of a crime
and therefore was libelous per se
which imputes malice. That therefore
the letter could not have been written in good faith. Chapin on Torts
314, 305, 338; Count Joannes vs. Bennet, 81 Am. Dec. 738; Simp~on vs.
The Press Publishing Co., 67 N. Y.
Supp. 401; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law 2nd Edition 863; Burns Ind. Statutes Revised Sec. 2180; Smith vs.
Matthews, 27 N. Y. Supp. 120;
Brooker vs. Coffin, 4 Am. Dec. 337;
Fiero on Torts, 717, 722, 746; Cooley
on Torts, 200, 207; Byam vs. Collins,
7 Am. St. Rep. 726; Hale on Damages, 151; Terwilliger vs. Wands, 72
Am. Dec. 420.
Clarence Manion and
Therman Mudd,
Attorneys for defendant.
The theory of the defense in this
case is that the communication alleged to be libellous is privileged. The
general rule concerning privileged
communications is as follows: A
communication made in good faith on
any subject in which the person has
an interest or with reference to which
he or she has a duty, public or private, legal, moral or social, if made
to a person having a corresponding
interest is privileged. 21 So. 109; 35
So. 615, McBride vs. Ledoux; 42 So.
591, Abraham vs. Baldwin; 79 Atl.
316, Krause vs. Rabe; 52 S. W. -,
Caldwell vs. Story; 101 S. W. 1164,
Rosenbaum vs. Roche; 24 Am. S. R.
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717, Rude vs. Nass; 31 So. 293, Buisson vs. Huard; 80 So. 316, Putnal vs.
Inman; 180 Pac. 216, Burton vs.
Dickenson; 167 Pac. 1118, Fahey vs.
Shafer; 99 N. W. 847, Mertens vs.
Bee Publ. Co.; 48 S. E. 327, Flanders
vs Daley; 110 Pac. 181, Melcher vs.
Beeler; 73 Mr. 87, Fresh vs. Cutter;
44 N. E. 992, Harriatt vs. Plimpton.
CAUSE NO. 6
Jaul J. Donovan
VS.
South Bend Motor Sales Co.
corporation
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff purchased a four-cylinder, new, 1920 model, Maxwell Automobile of the defendant. Defendant is a corporation, organized under
the laws of Indiana, and is engaged in
selling automobiles at South Bend,
Indiana. On August 1, 1920, plaintiff purchased the model of machine
described, having at the time inspected a sample machine in the sales
rooms of the defendant. Afterwards,
the defendant delivered the sample
machine which he had inspected,
which plaintiff accepted.
The plaintiff retained the car and
operated it for a period of ten months
and then returned it and demanded
his money, $900, paid for the machine. The machine was defective in
that the driving parts were not in
alignment-that is, the incased driving shaft and transmission gearsthereby causing trouble and several
"grinding out" of parts. There was
no express warranty of the machine
sold. The Maxwell car is manufactured by the Maxwell Motor Car Co.,
of Detroit, Michigan, and not by the
defendant.
Who should recover?

John P. Brady and
E. John Hilkert,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This was not the sale of any one
specific car but a sale of a certain
model by means of a sample car, the
specific car to be selected by the defendant later.
"Where the purchase necessarily
trusts and relies on the judgment of
a seller of an article that it is fit for
a particular purpose there is an implied warranty that the article shall
be reasonably fit for that purpose."
Anson on Contracts, Note pp. 131;
Tiffany on Sales pp. 257; Little v. G.
E. VanSyckle & Co., 73 N. W. 554;
Omaha Coal & Coke Co. v. Fay 55 N.
W. 211; Hyatt v. Boyle 25 Amer. Dec.
276.
The defect was latent and any reasonable inspection of the car on delivery could not have revealed the defect.
"If the seller is a dealer in goods
there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be free from any defect
rendering -them unmerchantable,
which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample."
Sec. 16 C., Sales Act. (Sales by sample) ; Griffin v. Metal Products Co.,
10 Atl. 713; Chapin v. Dodson, 34
Amer. Rep. 512.
The price paid by the plaintiff was
the price of a new car which impliedly warranted a corresponding article
necessarily free from defects.
"Where you pay a sound price for
a sound article you ought to get a
sound article, and if the article is defective and not fit for the purpose for
which it was bought, the seller ought
to make it good." Standard Boiler &
Plate Iron Co. v. Brock, 99 S. E. 769;
Best v. Flint, 56 Amer. Rep. 570;
Morse v. Union Stock Yards, 14 L. R.
A. 157.
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The defect was not discovered until
after the car was driven for about
ten months and upon discovery the
sale was promptly resciided.
"The time within which the right
to rescind is to be exercised must be
computed from the discovery of the
fraud or defect on which recission is
based and not from the date of sale."
Smith v. Columbus Buggy Co. 1.13
Pac. 580.
"Where the purchaser has exercised his right of rescinding the contract for fraud or breach of warranty, (express or implied) he is generally entitled to recover any payments
he may have made for the machine."
White, Auto Co. vs. Dorsy, 86 Atl.
867; Beecroft v. VanSchaick, 104 N.
Y. Sup. 458; Taylor v. 1st Nat. Bank,
167 Pac. 707.
J. Paul Cullen, and
Chas. B. Foley,
Attorneys for the Defense.
A latent or hidden defect in the drticle of sale which has arisen thru
the fault of the manufacturer and
not thru any fault of the vendor,
does not give vendee the right to rescind the contract. Note to 22 L. R. A.

193; Note to Bragg v. Morrill, 24
Am. Rep., 104.
To constitute a recission the property must be returned promptly after
the discovery of the defect; and any
unreasonable delay, or continued recognition of the contract of purchase
as a valid contract constitutes a
waiver of the right of recission. Sturgis v. Whistler, 130 S. W. 111; Coverdale v. Rickards & Watson, 69 Atl.
1065.
Where the purchased article afterit has been accepted by the vendee
turns out to have a latent defect or
in some respect is not fit for the purpose for which it is intended, this
does not give the vendee the right to
rescind the contract on implied warranty, since the vendee does not impliedly warrant th article as to latent
defects which are unknown to him,
and have arisen thru the fault of the
manufacturer. Remsberg v. Hackney
Mfg. Co., 164 Pao. 792.
The rule of caveat emptor is
strictly construed where the purchaser has the opportunity to inspect the
article and has the privilege to try it
out and ascertain its worth. Beirne
v. Lord, 55 Am. Dec. 321; Rogers v.
Niles (Ohio) 78 Am. Dec. 290.
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TRIAL BRIEFS IN CASE OF
James Whitcomb vs. Marshall Carper
Cause No. 2

Junior Moot Court
By

Arthur C. Keeney for Plaintiff
John F. Heffernan for Defendant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brings action to recover $200 paid to defendant as purchase
price for a horse, harness and buggy.
Plaintiff was a minor at the time of purchase, a married man with
wife and child, worked as a day laborer for the support of himself and
family, and did not use the purchased property except for pleasure riding.
Plaintiff, at time of bringing the action, had sold the harness and buggy,
and the horse had been condemned by the Society For The Prevention of
Cruelty To Animals as unfit for use. Notwithstanding plaintiff offered no
return of the property purchased he seeks to recover the money paid by
him as stated.
cessity, because, as set out in the
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF
Arthur C. Keeney, for Plaintiff
The first point we wish to present
is that this contract is a Voidable infant's contract, and the doctrine is
too elementary to require the citation of authorities. That the plaintiff herein is a minor and an infant
for all legal purposes and hence a
minor in regard to personal contracts. That the termination of the
guardianship on marriage does not
make him of legal age. Antonio v.
Miller, 34 Pac. 40.
The plaintiff brings an action to
recover the consideration lie has paid;
and in so doing is only exexrcising a
right given him by law to rescind his
contract, and not suffer by reason of
such contract. The action is to recover $100.00 for a horse, buggy and
harness which were used for pleasure purposes.
The articles of property involved
in this case were not articles of ne-

facts, the property was used only for
pleasure riding. It is manifest that
such horse and buggy are not necessaries. We believe this to be so because it would be a gross inconsistency to say that a horse and buggy used
for pleasure purposes by a man who
labored by the day to support his
wife, his child and himself, were
necessaries to him.
If it is a legal necessity then there
must be further proof that the infant
was in need of them. Therefore a
horse, buggy, and harness purchased
and used for pleasure purposes are
not necessaries.
Peck, Persons & Domestic Relations, pg. 212; 165 N. Y. 289,
Goodman vs. Alexander, 55 L. R.
A. 781.
Guthrie vs. Murphy, 28 Amer.
Dec. 681.
On the question as to the articles
in this case being necessaries we cite
Price vs. Sanders, 60 Ind. 30. In
this case it specifically states that

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTEA
these articles are not necessaries.
Any thing further on this point
would seem superfluous.
The fact that the infant is a married man has no effect, we believe, on
the status of the infant as he is concerned here. The fact that he is
married has no effect on his status
either for his benefit or to his detriment, but if it influences his relation
in contract at all, it does to his benfit.
Contracts not within the exceptions
for example, contracts of marriage,
those demanded by law, as the release
of mortgage for payment, and such
contracts as the law sets down as
mandatory for the infant to comply
with and perform, are all voidable.
It makes io difference that the infant has become emancipated by his
father, or is married, or is engaged
in business, or is nearly twenty-one
years of age and capable and of actual business capacity.
15 N. E. 476.
96 N. W. 895, Beichler vs. Guenther.
27 Amer. Rep. The Rose case.
Further-His status is not effected by the fact that he has a wife and
child or even children, if anything in
his status is to be changed in regard
to his liability he will be further protected, exclusive of contract for necessaries, because personal necessity
includes that of the wife and children.
Peck 213.
Ryan vs. Smith, 165 Mass. 303.
43 N. E. 109.
House vs. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109.
(Barber Tools by which infant
makes living.)
It is set out in the statement that
the infant sold the harness and buggy and that the horse was condemned
by the Society for the Prevention of

Cruelty to Animals as unfifit for use.

This fact we believe, has very little
bearing on the case, except in a passive way. In selling the harness and
buggy he exercised almost the capabilities of a competent person, there
being no further use for the bugy
and harness after the horse had been
condemned and taken from him. The
condemnation of the horse as unfit
for use lends to the inference that
the infant was a victim because of
incompetency. It is natural to believe
that a horse sold to be used for driving and for pleasure purposes would
not to be the kind to be so readily
condemned. The fact remains that
the horse was taken from the infant
plaintiff and out of his control.
This contract as we view it, was
not a contract for necessaries-not
a contract where the law binds the
infant; that this contract was injurious to the plaintiff, or was at
least disadvantageous and it was not
to his benefit but was to his damage.
The courts have held many times
that, as between different classes of
contracts, such contracts as were
clearly disadvantageous to an infant, were void; such as were clearly beneficial to the infant were valid
and binding, as the receipt of a gift,
or the purchase of necessaries; and
such as could not b eclearly classified as either harmful or beneficial
were voidable at the option of the
infant, and it is left for the infant
himself to determine the question,
and to avoid his contract ifit is injurious to him.
Peck, Domestic Relations pg. 207208; 5 Tenn. 41;
Wheaton vs. East, 26 Amer. Dec.
251.
Forda vs. Van Horn, 30 Amer.
Dec. 77.
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N. & C. R. R. vs. Elliott, 78 Amer.
Dec. 506.
From these facts and for these
reasons it is plain that the infant in
this case is not liable on his contract;
that in order to enforce it, it must
be reduced to a necessity, even business deailngs, removing the contract one degree from necessity, are
not valid without the intervention
of a guardian.
Wallace vs. Leroy, 110 Amer. St.
Rep. 777 and 50 S. E., 243
The facts also set out that the infant did not return the property.
Why didn't he return the property?
1. Because, part ot it (the horse)
had been taken from him and out of
his control.
2. Because the remainder had been
disposed of by him and applied to
help in part furnish the recreation
that he lost.
3. Because his statue as an infant
did not require him to make a return of the consideration under the
circumstances and acts of his case.
The authorities on this point concur that a faliure to return consideration dose not preclude recovery.
The case of Green vs. Green N.Y.
553 is very clear on this point. That
court held: "The right to repudiate
is based on the incapacity of the infant to contract, and that incapacity
applies as well to the avails as to the
property itself, and when the avails
of the property are spent or lost or
otherwise disposed of during minority, the infant should not be held
responsible for an inability to restore them. To hold him for the consideration would operate as a serious restriction upon the right of an
infant to avoid his contract, and in
many cases would destroy the right
altogether."

ifles vs. Lingerman-"One who
has disaffirmed a conveyance made
during infancy is not required to
tender back the purchase money to
session of the land.
If there is still a question as to
whether or not the infant can recover or not without returning the
consideration given him in this case,
we offer as additional authority in
support of our contention that he
does not; The Lemon Case, an Ohio
decision 15 N. E. 476, which says"An infant may, before or on arriving at age, disaffirm a purchase of
personalty, other than necessaries,
made by him during his minority,
and recover back the consideration
paid, without restoring the property
sold and delivered him where it has
been taken from him, or itis sufficient that the property ceases to be
in his possession or subject to his
control. "The case of Wallace vs. Lercy 110 Amer-St. Rep. 777 and 50 S.
E. 243, holds that in an action against
an infant to recover the purchase
money of property sold to him, part
of the proceeds he still retains, he
is entitled to the plea of infancy as
a defense, wtihout having returned
or offered to return such property
or proceeds. The successful intervention of such plea confers upon the
person who made the sale to the infant only the righ to reclaim his
property or such part of it as remains in the possession of the infant.
The case of Lamkin vs. Foster 64
Atlan. 1048-In this case the plaintiff tried to recover goods sold to
an infant. The infant had taken the
goods and did not pay any consideration, the infant sold the goods and
now the plaintiff tries to recover the
goods or their value, decision is for
the infant defendant. The reason
stated is that; This contract made by
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an infant, not for necessaries, and
his contract not having been ratified
the action to recover the price cannot e maintained.
In concluding the point we cite
three leading Indiana decisions,
which all hold that right of an infant to disaffirm and recover is not
dependent on the return of consideration.
Dill vs. Bowen 54 Ind. 204
Carpenter vs. Carpenter451nd. 142
Specifically states that the infant
does not have to return the property
received before he can recover.
White vs. Branch 51 Ind. 210
In this case the property was a
horse, and the infant wass allowed
to recover his consideration without)
return and where the consideration
received by him, he had abused and
depreciated its value.
Also in House vs. Alexander 105
Ind. 109 an infant who has purchased an unecessary article of personalty may rescind the contract
and recover.
Beichler vs. Guenther 96 N. W.
895.
The infant's consideration was a
team of horses, he sold the team of
horses and sued for his consideration,
and the court held that the infant
was not required to return his consideration.
The Indiana court also says in
45 Ind. 142 Carpenter vs Carpenter
-That it is not necessary, in order
to give effect to he disaffirmance of
a deed or contract of an infant, that
the other patry should be placed in
statu quo.
We believe we have shown conclusively:1. That the plaintiff was a minor,
and as such was not liable on this
contract.

2. That his marriage had no effect on his contract relation.
3. That the property in question
did not constitute necessaries.
4. That the consideration he received was inferior, and that he was
not a competent judge.
5. That under the circumstances
and facts in this case he was not required to return the property or
make a tender.
Wherefore the plaintiff's attorn
eys ask hat the law be applied as
here set out and that the infant
plaintiff be sustained in this action.
John F. Heffernan, for Defendant.
ISSUES.
The Issues in this case are:1. Has this infant the general
privilege extended, to infants of
avoiding their contracts, in view of
the fact that he has an emancipated
status as the result of the fact that
he is a married man and has a wife
and child.,
2. Even if this infant can avail
is it not essential that he return the
consideration he received before he
can hope to rescind the contract and
secure the consideration from which
he parted,
We contend: 1. That this infant,
by reason of his emancipated status
has the same obligations as a married person of adult age, i.e. at least
"The support and maintenance of
his family."
2. That it is essential before the
contract can be rescinded that the
infant return the consideration which
he received.
ARGUMENT
If ever there.was a case in which
the ends of justice were sought to
be defeated by the technical plea of
infancy, this is it. It must have been
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just such a case as this that prompted the famous Kent to write into his
"Commentaries", the sentence "Infancy is to be used as a shield and
not as a sword."
The first question to consider is
whether the infant's marital status
does not "emancipate" him from the
disabilities of infancy. To quote a
vs. Sherfey, 1 Iowa 358. "By emancipation, we understand such act of
the father as sets the son free from
his subjectiQn, and gives him the
capacity to manage his own affairs
as if he was of age.
Ruling Case Law: "In some states
by statute, all persons are made adults upon marriage. Such statutory
emancipation has the immediate effect of vesting the minor with the
capacity which the law recognizes
in persons of full age."
Glenn vs. Hollopeter 21 L. R. A.
847, California: "Under the general
rule of law, Grover Hollopeter became of lawful age when the marriage ceremony was performed. He
is thus entitled to sue in his own
name. The ordinary legal consequences follow his marriage."
Surely, it is the logical rule that
the infant who considers himself,
and whom the law considers, as
qualified to enter upon the most vital
and important contract which he
could possibly make,-- the contract
of marriage, is also qualified and
capable to protect himself in the ordin ary and incidental contracts incurred during life.
It is at least admitted that the infant's liability for contracts extends
from those for mere necessaries to
all contracts made in the furtherance of the support and maintenance
of his family. Cochran vs. Cochrane
196 N. Y. 86. Commonwealth vs.

Graham 16 L. R. A. 578. Aldrich vs.
Bennett 56 A. R. Stower vs. Hollis
83 Ky. 544.
The meaning of "support and
maintenance" is not restricted merely to the bare necessities of life. In
"Words & Phrases, p. 680 Vol. 8":
"The word "support" as used in a
contract whereby one agrees to support his wife, does not include merely sufficient provisions, but other
conveniences and necessaries as are
reasonable and suitable to make such
wife comfortable.'
Brewer vs. Brewer 113 N. Y. 161:
"Every wife is entitled to a home
corresponding with the circumstances and conditions of her husband."
Cyclopedia of Law-P. 73 Vol. 3:
"The husband undertakes to furnish
his wife a suitable home and maintain her according to his means and
condition and provide for their offspring."
It is clear from the above authorities that all contracts are deemed
contracts for the furtherance of the
support of the family, when they are
made for the benefit of the family
and are in keeping with the family's
station in life.
We contend that a horse, harness
and buggy, intrinsically intended for
family purposes as they were, are
included within the term "Support
and maintenance" when they are not
incompatible with the husband's
station in life, and we further contend that this $300.00 contract made
in order that the plaintiff's family
obtain recreation and pleasure was
not incompatible-was not an extravagant purchase on the part of the
plaintiff.
In many of the western states,
such as Iowa, Colorado, Oregon,
Washington, Nebraska, etc., not only
is the husban dliable for items of
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family expense but the wife also
may be held liable even though the
purchase was made by the husband.
Therefore, the plaintiff's wife, if
she were an adult, would be held
liable under the statutes of thdse
states.
A case directly in point with ours,
with respect tothis theory, is that of'
Houck vs. La Junta Hardware Co.,
Colorado, 114 Pac. 645. In this case
a buggy was purchased by a husband
for the use of his wife and family.
The question hinged upon whether
the purchase was properly one in
which the family was interested
and the court held "A PURCHASE
BY A HUSBAND OF A BUGGY
FOR FAMILY USE WHILE HE
AND HIS WIFE ARE LIVING TOGETHER CONSTITUTES A PROPER ITEM OF FAMILY EXPENSE.'
Inasmuch as my colleague has prepared an elaborate brief on the other
issue of this case (plaintiff cannot
rescind without restitution), I shall
not mane more than a passing reference to this phase of the case. This
is indeed a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery. As stated concisely
in Peck on "Domestic Relations" p.
224: "If the contract when made
was a fair and reasonable one, if it
has been completely performed on
both sides, and if by this actual performance the infant has been enriched or otherwise benefited, tho
he may not now retain in specie the

precise consideration which moved
to him, it is unjust for him to demand restoration of what the other
party received, unless he can so restore what he himself received as to
put the adverse party in statu que.
Cases in support of this proposition
are:
Riley v. Mallory 33 Conn. 201.
Coburn v. Raymond 100 Am. St.
Rep. 1000.
Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 280.
Taft v. Pike 14 Vt. 306.
Bailey v. Barnberger, 11 B. Mon.
(Ky.) 113.
Johnson v. N. W. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. 56 Minn. 365.
Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578
ecetera.
CONCLUSION
In view of the following rulings
of law:1. Restitution by an infant is a
necessary requisite before disafirmance.
2. An infant, emancipated by
marriage, assumes the liabilities
with respect to contract of an adult.
3. An infant's obligation to "support and maintain" his family covers
the purchase in question which was
made for the benefit of his family.
Any one of which is sufficient to
defeat the plaintiffs action, we respectfully urge, in further of the
obvious justice to be meted, that the
plaintiff in this case be stopped from
disaffirmance of his contract.

42
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TRIAL BRIEFS IN CASE OF
John D. Carson as Administrator of Estate of Ray Stephens,
Deaceased, vs. Charles D. Simpson and Edward Williams.
Cause No. 3
Junior Moot Court
By
Patrick E. Granfitld for Plaintiff
Clarence R. Smith for Defendants
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ray Stevens entered into an agreement with Charles D. Simpson to sell
him a horse on approval. The understanding was that Simpson was to take
the horse and try him, and if the horse should suit him, give Stephens his
note with approved sceurity; but if the horse should not suit him he was to
return the horse to Stephens.
A few days after this agreement Stephens was killed. Simpson did
not return the horse and did not execute his note, but later traded the horse
to the other defendant, Edward Williams.
Plaintiff brings action to recover the horse or its value.
in 2 Neb. 186, the court held that
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIIFF
where a vendee has taken possession
Patrick E. Granfield, for Plaintiff.
of the property but has not fulfilled
Rrom the facts above stated, it is his contract by giving his note, the
obvious that the case involves a sale vendor may rescind the contract and
maintain an action in replevin. Coron approval.
In 24 R. C. L., article on Sales on by on Law of Replevin, pages 127Approval, the law is stated as fol- 135, also state the law as applied by
lows: "The seller may in the default the court in the Nebraska case.
From the cases and authorities
of the buyer enforce his right to rerewe contend that the right to
of
cited
action
an
by
take possession
the contract was vested in
rescind
plevin."
upon the default of Simpplaintiff
the
deif
that
are,
The facts as stated
the note with apgiving
not
in
son,
horse
the
fendant Simpson wanted
security.
proved
approved
he was to give a note with
We submit that it is a sound prinsecurity. This Simpson did not do.
of law that a man cannot give
ciple
defaultTherefore we contend that he
title than he has himself and
better
rescind
a
ed and for this default we can
of the default of Simpson,
because
the contract as against Simpson.
defendant, Williams, has no
other
the
The following cases are cited to
property.
the
ot
title
support this contention:
We do not deny that Williams is a
Hollenberg Music Co. vs. Barron,
purchaser in good faith, but we hold
140 S. W. 582.
that even though Williams is a purFrisch vs. Wells, 86 N. E. 775.
454.
Pac.
72
chaser in good faith we can replevin
Page vs. Ulrich,
In the case of Sturo v. Hoile found the horse from him.
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In the case of Ballard v. Brigett,
40 'N. Y. 314, plaintiff sold and delivered over to one, William France on
the agreement that they were to remain the property of plaintiff until
paid for. France later sold them to
defendant who bought in good faith
for a fair price and without notice
of the condition. The court held that
the defendant even under such circumstances got no title as against
the plaintiff.
In the case of Bradshaw v. Warner,
et al. an Indiana case, found in 54
Ind. 58, the facts of which are as follows: The owner of personal property sold and delivered it to the purchaser at an agreed price payable at
a certain time, upon the express condition and agreement that the title
thereto should remain wholly in such
vendor until the full payment of said
purchase price, which was neve
paid. An officer holding an execution in favor of a third person
against such vendee, to satisfy the
writ, levied upon and sold such property to such third person, who knew
nothing of the vendor's title thereto,
and who had been informed by the
first purchaser that it was his own
property. The vendor later replevled the property from the purchaser
at said judicial sale. It was held that
the title to such property remained
in the plaintiff and that the defendant acquired no rights by his purchase at such judicial sale.
The case of Dunbar vs. Rawles, 28
Ind. 225, and the case of Hodson et
al. v. Warner et al., 60 Ind. 214 also
apply the law that should be applied
to this case, namely: That a third
person purchasing property in good
faith from another who has no title
to it, such property may be recovered by an action of replevin.

Wherefore, upon the reasons and
authorities cited the plaintiff contends that he had a right to rescind
the agreement upon the default of
Simpson and that the defendant,
Williams, having acquired no title because his co-defendant had nont,
plaintiff can maintain this action in
replevin against both defendants for
the recovery of the horse.
FOR THE DEFENDANT
Clarence R. Smith, for liefendants.
It is true that the plaintiff made
an agreement with our client, Mr.
Simpson, to sell him a horse on approval. Our client took the horse,
and if satisfactory he was to give the
plaintiff a note with approved security, nothing being said as to the time
in which he was to accept or reject
the horse. Nor was there a time set
within which he was to execute and
deliver the note. Therefore it is certain that he was to have a reasonable
time. The plaintiff died. Sometime
later our client, Simpson, traded the
horse to Williams. Our clients were
given no notice of Stephen's death
nor was there a demand made upon
them by Stephens' administrator for
the note or the horse. They were not
even informed by the administrator
of their obligation toward him.
The first notice given our clients is
this action against them for recovery
of the horse or its value.
The plaintiffs have no right of action against our clients for recovery
of the horse or its value.
Our client Mr. Williams received a
valid title to the horse when he received him from Mr. Simpson. The
very fact that Simpson traded the
horse to another was a valid acceptance of the sale and therefore he
passed a clear title to Williams. Ac-
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ceptance as used in the law of sales
of personalty means anything that
amounts to a manifestation of a determination on the part of the vendee
to accept the offer of the seller which
has been communicated or put in a
proper way to be communicated to
the party making the offer.- Mactiers admr's. v. Frith, 21 Am. Dec.
262.
The Sales Act, Part II, Sec. 19, provides that "When goods are delivered
to the buyer on approval or on trial
or on satisfaction, or other similar
terms, the property therein passes
to the buyer when he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or
does any other act adopting the
transaction. This rule of law is applied in the case of Dearborn v. Turner, 30 Am. Dec. 630. In this case the
plaintiff delivered to Nason a cow
and a calf, for which he took his written promise, to return the same cow
within a year, with a calf by her side,
or to pay twenty-two dollars. The
court said: "We are very clear, that
the security of the plaintiff vested in
contract; and that Nason, having the
alternative to return or pay, the property passed to him and he was at liberty to sell the cow.
The action of replevin is founded
on a tortious taking and detaining,
and is analogous to an action of trespass, but is in part a proceeding in
rem, to regain possession of the
goods and chattels; and in part a proceeding in personam, to recover damages for the caption and detention.
It is a possessory action, th egist of
which is the right of possession in the
plaintiff and the wrongful seizure
and detention by defendants.
Daggert v. Robins, 21 Am. Dec.
752.
Beach v. Botsford, 40 Am. Dec. 45.
Chestnut v. Sales, 121 Pac. 986.

An action of replevin does not
necessarily determine title. It is a
possessory action, and may fail either because the plaintiff shows no
right of possession, or because the
defendant is not shown to have
wrongfully withheld it.
Pearl v. Garlock, Michigan, 28 N.
W. 155.
We therefore maintain that the
plaintiff has no right of action
against our client, Mr. Simpson, for
he has not failed in fulfilling his obligation to the plaintiff. He has not
refused to eecute the note nor has
there been a demand made upon him
for its execution. And although he
has not executed and delivered the
note it is not a breach of the contract
of sale since he had a reasonable time
in which to deliver it. A reasonable
time-In the case of Bower v. Detroit Ry. Co. 20 N. E. 559, is defined
to be so much time as is necessary,
under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty
requires should be done iq a particular case.
This note, which was to be given
with approved security, requires
more time in its execution than an
ordinary note. For in Sweeney v.
Vanghor, 29 S. W., 903, it was held
that the word approve means to make
or show to be worthy of acceptance
and it has such meaning in a contract
providing that the purchaser of certain goods shall give a note with approved security.
The plaintiff cannot recover in a
replevin action in this sale on approval when our client has never refused
them the note. Tction cannot be
brought until a reasonable time has
expired and until our client has refused to fulfill his obligations.
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Bradford vs. Marbury, 46 Am. Dec.
264.
Girard v. Taggart, 9 Am. Dec. 327.
It is evident that our client Mr.
Simpson, has not failed in his agreement so as to give the plaintiffs a
right of action in replevin for the
tortious detention of the borse; there
being no such wrongful detention.
In the the celebrated case of Russell v. Englehardt it was held that
mere neglect to give a not in'consideration of goods delivered to him,
without a refusal of any application
therefore, will not give a right of
immediate action but it must affirmatively appear that the defendant
upon demnavd refused to execute the
note.
A demand is a requisition or request to do a particular thing specified under a clai mof right on the
part of the person requesting.
Brackenridge v. State. 11 S. W. 630
In the case of Yale v. Coddington,
reported in 21 Wendall, 173, the court
said: "When goods are sold to be
paid for by a note or bill payable at
a future day and the note or bill is not
given, the vendor cannot recover on
common count for goods sold and delivered until the credit has expired."
In Grant v. Groshaon, 3 Am. Dec.
724, in an action of covenant, the
court determined that the plaintiff
must show in the declaration that he
had, before bringing his suit, demanded the property; because without doing this he had not shown that
the debt was due and payable.
There are several cases where the
seller or vendor of goods has brought
action and recovered a note for the
measure of damages as the contract
price of the goods sold but in these

cases, without exception, there has
been a demand made upon the purchaser and a refusal by him before
action was brought. For example, in
the Ohio decision, Stephenson v. Repp
25 N. E. 803, it is stated that "Where
goods are purchased upon an agreement to give a promissory note for
the price payable in one year with
interest, the vendor may, without
waiting for the expiration of the
credit, maintain an action at once for
the breach of the agreement and the
measure of damages will be the price
of the goods sold and delivered, but
there must be a refusal of the purchaser to make and deliver the note
to the seller after the goods have
been delivered to him.
In Foster v. Adams, 15 Atlantic
169, it is decided that when one sells
property and agrees to accept in payment a note payable in time, and the
buyer refuses to give the note, then
the seller can sue at once. But our
clients have never refused to give the
note.
It is therefore the duty of the
plaintiff to show a right to the possession of the horse and a corresponding tortious possession in the defendant. We maintain that we legally
and lawfully obtained title to the
horse, first in the defendant Simpson,
who later traded the horse to Williams. Our client Simpson obtained
the horse on a legal sale on approval
and title passes by our acceptance of
such sale. Since our client Simpson
has neve rfailed to fulfill his contract
and since the plaintiffs have never
demanded the note nor been refused
its payment, it is our contention that
judgment should be entered in defendant's favor.
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ALUMNI
DEPARTMENT
Contributing Section
A STUDY IN
SPECIAL FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.*
By Francis J. Vurpillat, '91
*These findings of fact and conclusions of law were prepared and filed by
the writer as Judge of the Starke Circuit Court of Indiana, in the case of
Friebe vs. Elder etl al. A new trial as of right was immediately granted the
plaintiff under the statute directing the trial court to grant a new trial without cause, upon the filing of the application and bond by the aggrieved party.
A special judge tried the case anew and filed substantially the same findings
and conclusions. From the second judgment the case was appealed to the
Appellate Court of Indiana and affirmed. The case was then transferred to
the Supreme Court of Indiana, where it was again affirmed. Friebe vs.
Elder et. al (Ind. App.), 103 N. E. 429 Id., 181 Indiana 597-105 N. E. 151.

FIRST
That Paulina Friebe, the original
plaintiff, and Henry Friebe, now both
deceased, were married in the year
1857, and lived together as husband
and wife until the 6th day of August,
1901, when they separated; that for
thirty years continuously prior to
thier separation they were bona fide
residents of Starke County, Indiana,
residing on a farm in North Bend
Township; and that they continued
to reside in Starke County, Indiana,
throughout the year 1901.
SECOND
That at the time of their separation on August 6th, 1901, Henry
Friebe was the owner in fee simple
and in possession of the following
SPECIAL FINDING OF FACTS described real estate situated in
Starke County, Indiana, to-wit: (H.
AND CONCLUSIONS OF
I.) that said real estate was worth at
LAW.
that time $4,500 and was incumbered
with a school fund mortgage of
The court having been requested $2,000, dated August 25, 1898, in the
to find the facts specially and state execution of which Paulina Friebe
thereon conclusions of law, does now joined. That Henry Friebe was also
find the facts to be as follows, to-wit: the owner of personal property at
State of Indiana, ss:
In Starke Circuit Court,
January Term, 1910.
Paulina Friebe, deceased,
original Plaintiff;
Adolph Friebe;
Adolph Friebe, as Executor of
the will of Paulina Frebe,
deceased:
Ida Whipple,
Clara Kaempfe,
Carl Friebe,
substituted Plaintiffs,
VS.
Elmer D. Elder, and
Emma G. White, Administratrix
of the estate of
Henry Friebe, deceased.
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that time which was of the value of the home of her daughter, Emma G.
$500, and was indebted in the sum of White in the same neighborhood.
$300 in additional to the mortgage That sometime thereafter Henry
indebtedness mentioned. The court Friebe informed Paulina Friebe that
finds that in the purchase of said real he intended to apply to the Starke
estate and personal property of Circuit Court for a divorce and proHenry Friebe, said Paulina Friebe posed to her a financial settlement in
had invested $700 of her own money. view of such divorce; that negotiations to that end were carried on beTHIRD.
tween Henry Friebe, acting through
That there were born to said Henry
the son, Adolph Friebe, and Paulina
and Pauline Friebe seven children,
Friebe in person. And it was musix of whom were living at the time
agreed between said Henry
tually
of the separation, namely, Adolph
Friebe and Paulina Friebe that if
Friebe, Clara Kempfe, Emma G.
said Henry Friebe should be granted
White, Ida Whipple, Martha Brown
a divorce upon his petition he was to
and Carl Friebe. That all of said
pay Paulina Friebe $1000 in installchildren except Carl Friebe, had long
ments of $50 per year without intersince come of age, married and lived
est, secured by notes and mortgage,
apart from their parents. The parand that said Henry Friebe was to
ents, Henry and Paulina Friebe, at
take care of the imbecil son, Carl
the time of their separation were
Friebe. That Paulina Friebe was inliving alone with their son Carl
duced to waive her demand for interFriebe who was then 37 years of age
est upon the deferred payments by
and who has all his life been an imthe promise of the son, Adolph
becil and a care and charge upon his
Friebe, that he would give her a
parents.
home with him. That after this
FOURTH
agreement was made it was further
That for a long time prior to Au- agreed that they should go to the
gust 6th, 1901, said Paulina Friebe town of Knox, in Starke County, for
and Henry Friebe, in their old age the purpose of carrying out their
were dissatisfied and irritable, were agreement, and that Henry Friebe
completely estranged, had no affec- might make his application for dition for one another and did not live vorce.
together in peace and harmony. That
SIXTH
on said 6th day of August, 1901,
That on the 10th day of October,
Paulina Friebe left the old homestead 1901, Paulina. Friebe and Henry
and abandoned Henry Friebe with Friebe came to Knox, accompanied
the avowed purpose to never live with by their daughter, Emma G. White,
him again; and the court finds that and son-in-law, William White; that
said Paulina Friebe from that time there they went to the office of Peters
till the death of Henry Friebe neith- & Peters, lawyers, where Henry
er lived nor cohabited with him.
Friebe told Charles H. Friebe that he
FIFTH
wanted to procure a divorce from his
That after such separation Henry wife Paulina Friebe. That thereupFriebe continued to live at the old on said attorney Charles H. Peters
home with the demented son, Carl informed them that he could not act
Friebe, while Paulina Friebe lived at for both of them, that Mrs. Friebe
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must employ a lawyer, to which
Paulina Friebe replied that they had
made a settlement between them and
she did not want a lawyer. They
then left the office of Peters & Peters
and went to the court house where, in
the corridor they met the Judge of
That
the Starke Circuit Court.
that
Judge
the
told
Friebe
Paulina
for
apply
to
inetnded
Friebe
Henry
their
settled
had
they
a divorce, that
property right, that she did not want
to resist the divorce and would not
Then Paulina
employ a lawyer.
Friebe and Henry Friebe, accompanied by their daughter and son-in-law,
Emma G. White and William White,
and the Judge returned to the office
of Peters & Peters, where Charles H.
Peters, as attorney for Henry Friebe,
reduced to writing the agreement
theretofore entered into by Paulina
Friebe and Henry Friebe; also drafted the notes and mortgage in accordance with said agreement and also a
written appearance and waiver Df
issue and service of process in the
That said
contemplated divorce.
written contract signed and executed
by said Paulina Friebe and Henry
Friebe has become lost and cannot be
found after diligent search and inquiry therefor; That said contract
provided that Henry Friebe should
pay to Paulina Friebe $1000 in settlement of her property rights and
as alimony in installments of $50
cash and $50 per year thereafter until paid, without interest, to be secured by mortgage on eighty (80)
acres of the real estate of Henry
Friebe, described in finding No. two,
said Henry Friebe to pay for recording said mortgage and to pay the taxes thereafter assessed on said mortgage; and in the event of the death of
said Paulina Friebe, the balance of
said $1000 remaining unpaid, should

be paid within a year thereafter to
the heirs of Paulina Friebe. It was
further stipulated in said contract
that Henry Friebe, should take the
care and custody of their thirty-seven
years old son, Carl Friebe, and that
he should pay all the costs of the divorce proceeding should the divorce
be granted.
That Henry Friebe then made and
executed to Pauline Friebe his nineteen promissory notes for $50 each,
payable at the Farmers' State Bank
of Knox, Knox, Indiana, in one, two,
three, four, five, six, seven, eight,
nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen,
fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen,
eighteen, and nineteen years after
date respectfully and also executed
and acknowledged his mortgage to
Paulina Friebe upon eighty acres of
his said real estate described as follows, to-wit: (H. I.) To secure the
payment of said notes, which morlgage also provided that at the death
of the mortgagee, Paulina Friebe, the
entire unpaid balance of this mortgage should become due and payable,
within one year thereafter to the
heirs of said Paulina Friebe.
That Paulina Friebe also signed,
swore to and acknowledged the following written instrument as a part
of the same transaction in which the
notes and mortgages were executed,
to-wit:
State of Indiana
SS
County of Starke,
In the Starke Circuit Court
to October Term, 1901.
Henry Friebe
VS.
Paulina Friebe
The defendant, Paulina Friebe,
hereby enters her appearance to the
above entitled cause of action, and
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waives issueing of summons and the
service thereof, or any other notice
herein.

ther agreed between said Paulina
Friebe and Henry Friebe at the time,
that all the papers so prepared and
PAULINA FFIEBE.
executed should be left at the office of
Witnesses
Peters & Peters until the hearing upon the application of Henry Friebe
William J. White
Emma G. Wbite.
for divorce which, they were then inPaulina Friebe; being first duly formed, would be heard in the Starke
sworn by me, swears that she is the Circuit Court on October 28th, 1901,
identical Paulina Friebe mentioned when they were to be used in said diin the above and foregoing cause of vorce proceedings, and it was also
action as the defendant therein, and agreed that if a decree of divorce
that she signed the above waiver of should be granted to said Henry
Friebe, then the property rights and
notice.
alimony should be considered as setPAULINA FRIEBE.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, tled according to the terms of said
the undersigned notary public in written contract and the notes and
and for the County and State mortgage described should be delivaforesaid, this 10th day of October, ered to said Paulina Friebe.
1901.
EIGHTH
Charles H. Peters,
That on the 28th day of October,
(L. S.)
Notary Public. 1901, Henry Friebe, through his atMy commission expires Nov. 23, 1904 torneys, Peters & Peters, filed his
said
Paulina
At the time of the execution of said complaint against
Friebe
for
a
divorce
and
the
custody
papers Henry Friebe paid to Paulina
of
their
son
Carl
Friebe
in
the
Starke
Friebe $30 of the cash to be paid on
said contract, and after October 28th, Circuit Court. That no summons or
1901, paid to her $20 the balance of other process was issued on said complaint or served on said Paulina
said first cash payment.
Friebe, but the written waiver of
SEVENTH
such summons and service executed
The court finds that Paulina Friebe
by
said Paulina Friebe as set out in
and Henry Friebe were German peofinding number six was filed and preple, speaking and writing the German
language; that Paulina Friebe was sented in open court and the following minute thereof was made by.the
an intelligent and capable woman
and that on October 10th, 1901, at the trial court upon his bench docket, totime of the execution of the contract, wit:
waiver of service and notes and mort- "Defendant files waiver of summons
and service"
gage described in the last preceding
finding she examined and considered
The court finds that Paulina Friebe
said papers; that all of them were had notice that such complaint would
translated and explained to her in be filed and a hearing had thereon at
German by the daughter, son-in-law, that time, that on the morning of said
and the Judge, and that she approved day she was informed by William
and executed them with a full knowl- White, her son-in-law, with whom she
edge and understanding of their pur- was making her home at the time,
pose and purport. And it was fur- that that was the day upon which the
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hearing would be had on Henry Order Book No. 29, at page 287, and
Friebe's application for divorce, and is as follows:
she was asked to prepare herself and
Henry Friebe
accompany said White to Knox, for
No. 5130
vs.
Paulina Friebe
the purpose of appearing at said
trial; that she refused to go, stating
Comes now the plaintiff herein by Peters & Peters, his attorat the time that it was not necessary
neys, and files the waiver of the
for her to be present on the trial.
defendant of the summons and
And she then requested and directed
service, whch waiver is in words
said William White to go to Knox
and figures following, to-wit:
and appear upon. the trial for her and
State of Indiana, County of
state to the court that she did not
Starke, SS:
want to resist said Henry Friebe's
In the Starke Circuit Court, to
October Term, 1901.
application for divorce, that they had
settled their property rights, and
Henry Friebe vs. Paulina Friebe
that he, William White, should get
Paulina
defendant,
The
the notes and mortgage that had
Friebe, hereby enters her apbeen executed by Henry Friebe for
pearance to the above entitled
action, and waives issueing of
her if the divorce should be granted;
summons and the service therethat said William White as thus di-i
of, or any notice herein.
rected by Paulina Friebe went to
PAULINE FRIEBE.
Knox, and appeared at the trial for
Witnesses
her and in her behalf. That upon the
William J. White
filing of said written waiver and apEmma G. White.
pearance executed by the defendant,
Paulina Friebe, being first
Paulina Friebe, the court called said
duly sworn by me, swears that
defendant; that said William White
she is the identical Paulina
Friebe mentioned in the above
responded to such call in open court
and foregoing cause of action as
and stated that he had been directed
the defendant therein, and that
by the defendant to appear and state
she signed the above waiver of
to the court that she did not want to
notice.
resist the plaintiff's application for
PAULINA FRIEBE.
divorce; that thekr had settled their
Subscribed and sworn to before
me, the undersigned Notary
property rights by agreement and
Public in and for the County
that she wanted to be protected in
and State aforesaid, this 10th
said agreement. That no other apday of Oct., 1901.
pearance was made by the defendant
Charles H. Peters,
(Seal)
Paulina Friebe, that no lawyer apNotary Public.
peared for her or in her behalf at
My commission expires Nov. 23,
1904.
such proceedings for the reason that
And said defendant now failshe refused to employ one.
ing to appear and plead further
That thereupon the Starke Circuit
Court assumed jurisdiction of said
cause, tried the same and made a finding and pronounced judgment thereon, the record of which appears in

is three times audibly called in
open court, comes not but herein
wholly makes default. And the
cause being now at issue, and a
jury being waived, is submitted
to the court for trial, finding and
decree; and after hearing all of
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the evidence and being fully advised in the premises the court
does find in favor of the plaintiff,
that the allegations of his complaint are true, and that he is entitled to a decree of divorce
from the defendant on the
grounds alleged in his complaint;
and also finds that all of the
property rights of the plaintiff
and the defendant have been
amicably settled between them.
And the court further finds that
the plaintiff is a fit person to
have the care and custody of
their infant child, Carl Friebe,
and that said plaintiff is entitled
to the care and custody of such
child till the, further order of
this court.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court
that the bonds of matrimony
existing between the plaintiff
and the defendant be dissolved
and the plaintiff be granted a divorce from the defendant; that
the plaintiff have the care and
custody of Carl Friebe until .the
further order of this court. And
it is also ordered that the plaintiff pay all costs of this action,
taxed at $NINTH
The court finds that on said 28th
day of October, 1901, after the rendition of said decree of divorce, Henry Friebe delivered to William White
for Paulina Friebe, the notes and
mortgages described in finding number sixth and that said William White
on that same day delivered said notes
and mortgage to said Paulina Friebe
in person and informed her of the
proceedings had in court and of the
decree of divorce granted by the
court to Henry Friebe; and that from
that time until the death of said
Henry Friebe she lived separate and
apart from him, characterized herself, and held herself out to the
world by her statements and her con-

duct, as the divorced wife of Henry
Friebe. And that at no time from
the rendition of said decree of divorce
until the institution of the present
suit did she ever question the validity
of said decree or take any steps to
vacate the same, but on the contrary
she recognized said decree and every
year collected from Henry Friebe the
notes held by her by reason of said
divorce proceedings and caused the
mortgage securing the same to bE
recorded in the Recorder's Office of
Starke County, Indiana, which notes
and mortgage, the court finds, constituted a part of the consideration for
the settlement of all property rights
of the plaintiff and the defendant
that said decree of divorce refers to
as having been made by them. That
Henry Friebe complied with all the
terms and conditions of the contract
between him and Paulina Friebe described in finding sixth, to be complied with on his part from the time
of the rendition of said decree; he
had the care and custody of said imbecil son, Carl Friebe, with whom he
lived until his death; that he paid to
Pauline Friebe every year the installment notes as they fell due and paid
the taxes on the mortgage held by
Paulina Friebe together with the fee
for recording same.
TENTH
The court finds that Henry Friede
continued to own the real estate described in finding number two and
lived thereon until the 8th day of August, 1907, when he sold and conveyed the same to the defendant Elmer
D. Elder; that on said day Henry
Friebe executed and delivered to said
Elmer D. Elder three deeds of conveyance for said real estate, in each
of which deeds he described himself
and acknowledged himself to be a
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widower, and warranted the title to
the real estate therein described by
general covenants of warranty; that
Paulina Friebe did not join in any of
said conveyances. That one of said
deeds conveyed the following tract of
land, to-wit: (H. I.) to Elmer D. Elder as grantee; that another of said
deeds conveyed the following described tract, to-wit: (H. I.) to Bessie R.
Elder, a daughter of the defendant
Elmer D. Elder, said Elmer D. Elder
paying all the consideration therefor,
and taking title to himself in his
daughter's name; that another of said
deeds conveyed the following described 'tract, to-wit: (H. I.) to Vina
B. Elder, another daughter of the defendant Elmer D. Elder, said Elmer
D. Elder paying all the consideration
therefor, and taking title to himself
in said daughter's name. That all of
said deeds of conveyances were delivered by said Henry Friebe to the
defendant Elmer D. Elder, who immediately took possession of alt the
lands therein as the owner, and he
has ever since occupied and claimed
title to all of said lands by virtue of
said conveyance, and by no other or
different source of title, except that
afterwards in October, 1907, said
Bessie R. Elder and Vina B. Elder,
his daughters both unmarried, executed and delivered to him their
deeds of conveyance for said real estate. That all of said deeds herein
mentioned were duly recorded in the
Office of the Recorder of Starke
County, Indiana.
And the court further finds that
said Elmer D. Elder paid as consideration for said real estate $30 per
acre, and that as a part of said consideration he assumed and agreed to
pay the notes and mortgage held by
Paulina Friebe against eighty acres

of said land, as described in finding
sixth; that he also executed and delivered to said Henry Friebe a mortgage in the sum of $850 to secure the
balance of the purchase money for
said real estate, which mortgage is
upon the following described tract,
to-wit: (H. I.)
ELEVENTH
The court finds that prior to the
purchase of the lands of Henry
Friebe by the defendant Elmer D.
Elder, as found in the last preceding
finding, said defendant Elder had occasion to examine.the abstract of title to said real estate and had knowledge of the decree of divorce rendered in the Starke Circuit Court in favor of said Henry Friebe against said
Paulina Friebe, as set out in finding
number eight, and that he also had
knowledge of the mortgage and notes
executed by said Henry Friebe to said
Paulin Friebe covering eighty acres
of said real estate as mentioned in
finding number sixth, which mortgage and notes he afterwards assumed and agreed to pay to said Paulina
Friebe as part of the purchase money for said real *estate. That the defendant Elder also had the opinion
of an attorney-at-law, who examined
said abstract for him, that the title
to said real estate was then in said
Henry Friebe, as the divorced husband of said Paulina Friebe.
And the court further finds that
before the purchase of said real estate said defendant Elder went to the
lands for the purpose of inspecting
the same and with the view to negotiating for their purchase, and that
on his way to said lands he called at
thehomeof William White, which was
also the home of said Paulina Friebe,
because he had been informed by
said William White that said Friebe
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lands were for sale. That at the time
he called at the William White home
he saw and met Paulina Friebe, and
that at the time he believed her to be
the divorced wife of Henry Friebe,
living separate and apart from him
because of such decree of divorce,
and that said Paulina Friebe was
then and there informed by the
daughter, Emma G. White, and her
son-in-law, William White, that the
defendant, Elmer D. Elder, was the
man who was to purchase said lands,
and that said Elder was then going
to the lands and the home of said
Henry Friebe in company with her
son-in-law, William White, to negotiate for their purchase.
And the court finds that said
Paulina Friebe then and there remained silent and made no protest
against said purchase and said nothing and asserted no claim that she
was the wife of Henry Friebe, although, as the court finds, she had
sometime prior thereto been advised
that the decree of divorce rendered
six years before in favor of said Henry Friebe was defective and invalid.
That said defendant, Elmer D. Elder,
in company with said William White
then went to the home of Henry
Friebe on the lands described and
there negotiated the purchase of said
real estate from said Henry Friebe,
as detailed in finding number ten;
and immediately thereafter said William White returned to his home and
informed Paulina Friebe that said
defendant Elmer D. Elder had purchased the real estate of said Henry
Friebe, and that he had agreed to
pay the notes and mortgage held by
her.
And the court further finds that
after said Elder had purchased and
taken possession of said real estate

that said Paulina Friebe knew that
said defendant was claiming to be
the owner of all said real estate by
virtue of the deeds of conveyance to
him from Henry Friebe as widower
and free from any claims she might
assert as his wife; and that said Elder made lasting improvements on
said real estate with the knowledge
of Pauline Friebe, and without any
assertion by her of any right, title or
interest in said real estate as the wife
of said Henry Friebe, and without
calling in question the validity of
said decree of divorce; but that from
the time of said purchase of the real
estate by the defendant Elmer D. Elder said Paulina Friebe continued to
live separate and apart from said
Henry Friebe.
And the court further finds that
said defendant Elmer D. Elder has
paid two of the annual installments
notes falling due since the purchase
of said real estate; that the first of
said notes so falling due.he paid to
Paulina Friebe, in person, at her home,
during the life time of Henry Friebe,
and she accepted such payment and
deivered up to said Elder said note
in person, and that the second of said
notes due and payable to said Paulina
Friebe said defendant Elmer D. Elder paid at the Farmers' State Bank
of Knox, in Knox, Indiana, where
said notes were made payable, and
that said note was then and there delivered to said defendant Elder and
had indorsed thereon at the time of
such payment the name "Paulina
Friebe," which note the court finds
had been so indorsed by said Paulina
Friebe, and that said Paulina Friebe
received the money in payment for
such note, and that this second note
paid by the defendant Elmer D. Elder
was paid, and the money therefor re-
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ceived by said Pauline Friebe, after
the institution of this suit by her.
And the court further finds that
said Paulina Friebe continued to hold
said notes so payable to her and secured by said mortgage until after
the institution of this suit and until
the time of her death; and that said
notes remaining unpaid at the time
of her death are now held by her estate.
And the court further finds that at
no time prior to the commencement
of this action or since, did Paulina
Friebe or the substituted plaintiffs
surrender or offer to surrender to
any one the notes and mortgage held
by said Pauline Friebe in settlement
of her property rights under the decree of divorce as heretofore found.
TWELFTH
And the court also finds that after
the sale of his said real estate to the
defendant, Elmer D. Elder, as heretofore found, said Henry Friebe informed Paulina Friebe of his intention to divide his estate and distribue the proceeds of said real estate
among their children, and that Paulina Friebe at the time expressed her
approval of said purpose; and that
thereafter said Henry Friebe did distribute the proceeds of the sale of
said real estate among his said children as follows:
To Adolph Friebe, $ 800.00
To Clara Kempfe, $1000.00
To Ida Whipple, $ 50.00
And that he retained the note for
$875.00 secured by mortgage on his
real estate, being the mortgage that
the defendant Elmer D. Elder gave
to secure the unpaid purchase money
as heretofore described in the findings, for the future care and support
of the imbecil son, Carl Friebe; that

Henry Friebe also gave to Emma G.
White, another daughter, $50.00.
The court finds that at the time of
said distribution all of said distributees, children of said Henry and
Paulina Friebe, knew that the money
so distributed was a part of the proceeds of the sale of the Henry Friebe
lands, and knew said Henry Friebe
had sold all of said real estate, had
warranted the title thereto by general covenants of warranty in the conveyance made by him, as the divorced
husband of their niother, Paulina
Friebe, and that they also knew of
the rendition of the decree of divorce
between their said parents, and that
since is rendition said Paulina Friebe
and Henry Friebe lived separate
and apart as divorced. That from
the time of the rendition of said decree of divorce said Pauline Fiiebe
made her home with her said children
and expressed her satisfaction with
that such decree of divorce had been
granted and that she was living separate and apart from said Henry
Friebe.
THIIRTEENTH
That Henry Friebe died inestate in
Starke County, Indiana, on October
28th, 1907, leaving surviving him
said Paulina Friebe and his children
named in finding number two; that
on or about te 2nd day of December,
1907, the defendant, Emma G. White,
was duly appointed administratrix of
the estate of said Henry Friebe, deceased, and she qualified and gave
bond as such administratrix and is
now acting as such.
And the court finds that said administratrix has in her possession
among the assets of said estate the
note of the defendant Elmer D. Elder for $850.00 secured by mortgage
on the land described in the forgoing
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findings, to-wit: (H. I.) which were
given for the balance of the purchase
money for said real estate as heretofore found as described in plaintiff's complaint in this action.
FOURTEENTH
That on the 21st day of August,
1909, and during the pendency of her
action, said Paulina Friebe died testate in Starke County, Indiana, and
her last will and testament was fully
probated in the Starke Circuit Court
on the day of -,
1909, and
duly recorded in the office of the
clerk of the Starke Circuit Court;
that by the provisions of her said will
Adolph Friebe was named as the sole
executor thereof, and that said
Adolph Friebe on the day of
, 1909, duly qualified and
gave bond and entered upon the duties of his said trust and is now acting in that capacity, and as such executor is one of the substituted plaintiffs in this action. That by the provisions of said will, Adolph Friebe,
Clara Kempfe, Ida Whipple and Carl
Friebe are made and constituted the
only deviseds and legatees of said
Paulina Friebe, and to them her estate is given, devised and bequeathed
share and share alike; and that all
of said devisees and legatees are subsituted plaintiffs in this action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WHEREFORE upon the foregoing
facts the court concludes the law to
FIRST:That the original plaintiff, Paulina
Friebe, at the time of the death of

Henry Friebe and at the time of the
filing of her complaint herein, was
estopped to deny the validity of the
decree of divorce rendered by the
Starke Circuit Court of Indiana in
the case of Henry Friebe against
Paulina Friebe as set out in the foregoing findings, and that she was estopped at such time from asserting
any claim of right, title or interest in
or to the real estate conveyed by
Henry Friebe to defendant Elmer D.
Elder as the surviving wife of said
Henry Friebe.
SECOND:That the substituted plaintiffs and
each of them at the time of the death
of their mother Paulina Friebe were
estopped to deny the validity of the
decree of divorce rendered by the
Starke Circuit Court of Indiana, in
the case of Henry Friebe against
Paulina Friebe as set out in the foregoing findings, and that they and
each of them are estopped to assert
any claim of right, title or interest in
or to the real estate conveyer by Henry Friebe to the defendant, Elmer D.
Elder, in right o
their mother,
Paulina Friebe, as original plaintiff
through her last will and testament
as devisees and legatees of said will.
THIRD:That the plaintiffs take nothing by
this action either as original or substituted plaintiffs and that the defendants and each of them recover
from plaintiffs their costs in this action laid out and expended and taxed
at dollars.
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NOTRE DAME MEN
OF THE ST. JOSEPH COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
(Indiana)
By
Arthur B. Hunter, LL. B., '20
The Bar dockets of the Circuit and
Superior Courts of Saint Joseph
County list the names of thirty-one
N. D. men, each one of whom is proud
to claim the hcnor of having attended
the Law School of Nbtre Dame University. Cncerning not a few of these
men whole volumes might profitably
be written, but inasmuch as each considers himself not better than the
others, it shall be my purpose to give
but a short matter-of-fact statement
regarding each. If I should omit any
Notre Dame man from the !ist I hope
that he will be kind enough to believe
that it is inadvertence or ignorance
on my part rather than ill will or design and that he will prmptly supply
the Reporter with the information
concerning himself.
Mr. Leo J. Cook, 1918, is building
up a good practice for himself and is
well located in the Union Trust
Building.
Mr. Walter L. Clements, 1918, a
Kentucky gentleman who was attracted to South Bend during the
years that he spent at Notre Dame,
returned to us after serving in the
army, and has since been associated
in a very active way with Messrs.
Hubbell and Van Fleet in the Citizens
Bank Building.
Mr. Edward M. Doran, president
of the class of 1920, is well connected
with the law firm of Shively and Gilmer, in the Farmers Trust Building.
Mr. G. A. Farabaugh, 1907, is one
of the leading attorneys of South
Bend. "Judge" is so well known to

every Notre Dame man that it is
hardly necessary to recount his many
legal activities. He won his title of
affection from the term which he
served as City Judge of South Bend.
He has offices in the J. M. S. Building.
Mr. Samuel Feiwell, 1918, was a
candidate for the Democratic nomination for Prosecuting Attorney in the
last election. He has offices of his
own in the Citizens Bank Building.
Mr. Ralph Feig, 1907, is at present
city judge of Mishawaka. He finds
time in addition to take care of his
large practice in the Circuit and Superior Courts here.
Mr. Edwin A. Frederickson, 1920,
has offices with "Judge" Farabaugh.
In addition he finds time to teach in
the Notre Dame Law School along
with the Judge. "Freddie" assures
us that he loves the law and we are
convinced.
Mr. Charles Hagerty, 1912, also
has offices with Judge Farabaugh and
thus completes a 100 per cent N. D.
law office. Mr. Hagerty has been active as a lobbyist at the present session of the Indiana legislature and explains his success as such by reminding us that he has just completed a
term as State Senator from Saint Joseph County.
Mr. Vernon R. Helmen, 1917, since
returning from military service has
maintained an office for himself In
the Farmers Trust Building where he
is building up a profitable business.
Mr. Patrick J. Houlihan, 1892, is
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one of the old "grads" who are always
proud of Notre Dame. He has been
prominent in political circles locally
for a number of years. He has offices in the Title Building. His ability was best demonstrated by the fact
that he was chosen and served four
years as County Attorney of Saint
Joseph County.
Mr. Thomas Hoban, LL. B., 1899,
LL. M., 1900, is Sec'y.-Treas. and
Gen'l Mgr. of the South Bend Brewing Assn. His arduous duties with
this company, however, do not prevent him from maintaining his law
office, which is located in the Union
Trust Building.
Mr. Floyd 0. Jellison, 1915, is the
newly elected Prosecuting Attorney
of St. Joseph County. He took office
January 1, 1921.
Mr. Vitus G. Jones, 1903, is one of
the most active and prominent of the
lawyers of South Bend. He is the
senior member of the firm of Jones
& Obenchain with offices in the Union
Trust Building. His lucrative practice is but a faint index to his high
abilities as a lawyer and a true Notre
Dame man.
Mr. Joseph J. Kovacs, 1916, has a
thriving practice. He is associated
with Messrs. Dekelbaum and Hosinski. They have offices in the Farmers Trust Building.
Mr. Arthur L. May, 1918 and LL.
M. 1919, is well located with the prominent law firm of Anderson, Parker,
Crabill and Crumpacker. "Art" is
steadily increasing his clientle. He is
located in the J. M. S. Building.
M. Ernest M. Morris, 1906, is a
former member of the Board of Public Works and is at present president
of the Associated Investment Company. The latter company, with offices in the Farmers Trust Company
building, has grown to such an ex-

tent as to claim practically all of his
time and thus to draw him out of the
active practice of the law.
Mr. Thomas D. Mott, 1895, is an
ex-judge of the Saint Joseph Superior Court. He has also held the office
of Federal Judge in Porto Rico. At
present he is busily engaged in floating a corporation which will engage
in the shipping business.
Mr. Joseph Walter McInerny, 1906,
of the firm of McInerny, Yeakley and
McInerny, is an active booster for
Notre Dame. He was formerly editor of the South Bend News-Times.
During the last campaign he was
chairman of the election board of
St. Joseph County.
Mr. William A. McInerny, 1901, of
the firm of McInerny, Yeagley and
McInerny, located in the Conservative Life Building, is one of the leading lawyers in Indiana. Soon after
his graduation he was appointed to
the Board of Public Works of the city
of South Bend and has ever since
made good with a vengeance. He is
well known as a legislative lobbyist
and a real estate promoter. His chief
fame as a lawyer, however, is founded upon the many important cases
which he has handled for public utilities before the various State commissions.
Mr. Mr. William B. O'Neill, 1906,
served as Lieutenant Governor of Indiana for four years beginning in
1913. Although Mr. O'Neill's home
is in Mishawaka he has offices for his
practice, Ronald S. O'Neill, 1914, in
the Citizens Bank Building in South
Bend, Indiana. Ronald is at present
however, connected with the ErwinWasey Co., 58 E. Wash. St. Chicago,
Illinois.
Mr. J. Elmer Peak, 1912, in addition to his legal activities is at present kept very busy as the Grand
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Knight of the South Bend Council of
the Knights of Columbus. He has of
fices in the Farmers Trust Building.
Mr. George W. Sands, is a former
member of the Indiana legislature.
He cares for his extensive practice
from his offices in the Conservative
Life Building. Genial George is a
prominent court attorney of the Saint
Joseph County Bar.
Mr. John M. Raab, former student
of the Notre Dame Law School, is the
newly elected secretary of the Saint
Joseph County Bar Association. He
is connected with the law firm of
Deahl and Deahl whose offices are located in the J. M. S. Building.
Mr. F. Armand Schellinger, 1919,
is well located with the strong law
firm of Jones and Obenchain in the
Union Trust Building. In addition
Armand has recently opened a part
time officein his home town of Mishawaka.
Mr. John Schindler, 1909, is one of
the prominent attorneys of Mishawaka. He has just been elected vicepresident of the Saint Joseph County
Bar Association for 1921.
Mr. George A. Schock, 1917, has
just finished a term as deputy prosecuting attorney. He was snowed under in the fall election when he was
the Democratic candidate for Prosecuting Attorney but he had the satisfaction of knowing that he ran several hundred votes ahead of the rest of
his ticket. Since January 1, 1921,
he has been associated with the firm
of Deahl and Deahl.
Mr. Samuel Schwartz, 1913, completed two very successful terms as
Prosecuting Attorney on January 1,
1921. He is now engaged in private
practice with offices in the J. M. S.
Building.
Dudley M. Shiveley, '91, is a prominent member of the Bar in South

Bend, is the senior partner of the
firm of Shiveley & Gilmer, with offices in the Farmers' Trust Building.
Mr. Shiveley enjoys a lucrative general practice.
Mr. Edwib H. Sommerer, 1916, is
engaged in practice for himself with
offices in the Farmers' Trust Building. At the last election he was a
candidate for the State legislature.
I am happily situated here with the
firm of McInerny, Yeagley and McInerny. Mr. Yeagley is president of
the Saint Joseph County Bar Association for 1921. Altho he is a big man
and a very busy man he is never too
busy to listen to my problems and
questions. He, too, is a very good
friend of Notre Dame. During the
football season our whole office force
generally attends the home games
played here and roots for Notre
Dame every time and all the time.
CLASS OF '20 AT THE BAR EXAMINATIONS
Their Letters and Reports
OHIO
BELCHER & CONNOR
Attorneys-at-Law
52-56 Ruggery Bldg.
Columbus, Ohio
Hon. F. J. Vurpillat
Notre Dame, Ind.
My dear Judge:
As I told you some time ago in an
abrupt postal message, I am now an
honest-to-goodness attorney "by reason of the authority in me vested by
the state." The Ohio Bar examination was held December 7th and 8th,
and I came through in good style.
Paul Daugherty, whom you probably
remember as being in the Law School
in 1817-1918 and 1918-1919, was also
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present and received his certificate. first touchdown on the field of the
"Walter Rielly Miller" was called law, attaining the goal of admission
three times, but no response was to the Ohio Bar.
forthcoming.
651/2 Public Square,
The Exam. was no easy matter.
Lima, 0., Jan. 17, 1921.
Constitutional Law was an especially Hon. F. J. Vurpillatt,
hard subject ,and I felt the need of
Dean of the College of Law,
all the training you tried so earnestUniversity of Notre Dame,
ly "to imbibe us with" every day from
Notre Dame, Indiana
eleven to twelve a. m. last year.
Dear Judge:
I am now connected, however
After a few months of absence
slightly, with this reputable firm, from Notre Dame I find it necessary
and am getting some real experience. to call upon you to duplicate the favMr. Connor is a Fourth Degree K. of or which you tendered me some time
C. and Mr. Belcher is a good old So- past. Will you please sign the withcialist. It makes an invincible com- in enclosed certificate and return the
bination.
same to me immediately?
Well, this is on the firm's time, so
School days for myself have passed
I must close and seek to overcome my into oblivion, I am afraid, but there
unfamiliarity with the Code of Ohio. is a possibility that I can return to
Remember me to the Faculty and Notre Dame for a degree. It will be
students of the Law School.
some time, however.
Sincerely yours,
I hope you are getting along real
well.
I find that you have the corHarry P. Nester.
rect system of teaching and every
P. S. I signed my first demurrer subject I had under you seems to be
yesterday. Hope that unlike our the surer nowledge of law in my
Moot Court experience, this one will mind. Judge altho I made several
(what I thought were convincing)
be sustained.
speeches on The League of Nations
Although the Reporter has receiv- nevertheless it didn't seem to do
ed no word from Walter himself, the much good for Cox. "It is better to
foregoing letter of Mr. Nestei re- have tried and failed, than not to
ports that the name of Walter Riley have tried."
Miller was calle.d for the reception
Will stop now Hoping you will
of the certificate of admission to the continue in your success for years to
Ohio Bar. True to his habit of si- come and thanking you very much
lence whenever he made a spectacu- for the interest which you took in me
lar touchdown on the gridiron for while a student at Notre Dame, I am
the Varsity football team, Walter is
Respectfully,
again silent upon the occasion of his
Joseph H. Flick.
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MEXICO
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA

Correspondencia del Secretario Particular
Mexico, 13 Jan. 1921.
Mr. Francis Vurpillat,
Dean of the College of Law,
Notre Dame University,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
My very dear friend and esteemed
Prof.:
Excuse me the unreasonable delay.
I tried to write you many times, but
never succeed. Causes? Reasons? I
don't know. Really that lazinessI'm guilty of, was unwillfully out of
my wishes.
Now, with the most sincere pleasure--I write you sending my New
Year's greetings for you and your
very respectable family.
I was appointed by the President
of the Republic, Private Counsellor
for the Presidency, Chief of the Legislative Commission of the Executive
and Chief of Official Information in
the Capital, and, as such, I'm glad to
be at your unconditional service.
Moreover, I opened a private office to do any kind of business in the
city, and hope to do something good.
nd you, dear Prof., how are you
getting along? Send me your Law
the
and
Magazine immediately
as
soon
as
all,
"Scholastic"-I'll pay
I get 'em
Give my friends, specially to Prof.
Tiernan and Costello, all kind of regards. Love for Notre Dame. And
for you and your family my, heart as
your best friend and pupil.
Alfnso Anaya.
P. S.-Show this letter to the Very
Rev. Burns. Shake hands with him
in my name, and tell him I'm his as
ever and forever.

CALIFORNIA
Word comes to us that Leo J.
Ward has taken the recent examination for admission to the California
Bar. Although official announcement of the results of the examination have not yet been made, we are
informed that Leo is elated over his
showing in the examination and confidently expects his certifificate of
admission.

INDIANA
Edward C. McMahon, upon his recent visit to the University to the
Madison County Bar Association at
Anderson, Indiana, and of his start
in the practice of the law.

MICHIGAN
We are informed that Clifford
O'Sullivan, who passed ,the examination for admission to the Bar in Illinois last June and whose letter appeared in the November issue of the
Reporter, has since successfully passed the Bar examination in Michigan
where he has located for the practice
of the law, in the offices of Walsh &
Walsh, 37-39 White Block, Port
Huron.
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POINTS, PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL, POLITICAL
About the Alumni
The Chicago Tribune of February
4th carried the following reference
to a talented LL. B man of Notre
Dame:
"YOUNGEST AID OF MR. CROWE
TAKES UP NEW DUTIES"
"William C. Henry, who commenced his duties in the office of State's
Attorney, Rober E. Crowe yesterday,
is the youngest assistant state's attorney in the office. He comes from
the Eighth ward. He was admitted
to the bar in 1916, when 21 years old.
Mr. Henry is a graduate of Notre
Dame. He was in the military service and was two years overseas. He
is an appointee of P. H. Moynihan,
newly named member of the State
Utilities Commission and the Republican committeeman of the South Chicago district. He has been assigned
to the South Chicago Court." Needless to say we are proud of Will Henry's success and the credit he is reflecting upon the University and the
Law School.
A letter from Thos. V. Truder, Las
Vegas, New Mexico, tells us that he
has been appointed to the position of
assistant District Attorney, the district comprising three counties. The
salary is one thousand dollars. "Tom"
is also starting a night school under
the auspices of the Vocational Department, and later he will endeavor
to establish a K. of C. school. Good,
Thomas V. Continue.
We are in receipt of a letter from
Joseph C. McGinnis, LL. B., 1920,
who is now in the offices of Branigar
Bros. Co., 117 North Dearborn St.,
Chicago. Joe requests certificate of
work in the Law School for filing

with the State Board of Law Examiners of Illinois, before whom he expects soon to take the examination
for admission to the Illinois Bar. Joe
writes: "I am contemplating taking
the bar examination in the near future and hope that in so doing I shall
be able to reflect upon you, your assistants and the Institution the highest credit possible." Success, Joe,
Old Boy.
During the holiday vacation, William A. Miner, of the junior class,
took occasion to visit Francis J. Clohessy of the Class of '20 in his law office in Waverly, New York. Miner
speakst in glowing terms of Clohessy's busy office, numerous clients, evident prosperity and prospects. IHe
says that Francis J. is very popular
and is freely spoken of as a probable
nominee for a judicial office.
Since the November Reporter, in
which we related the facts about
Richard B. Swift, '20, and his start in
the practice of law in Muscatine,
Iowa, in an office all his own, we
learn that Richard has formed a partnership with an old attorney of that
city and hereafter will be known as
a member of the firm of Warner &
Swift, the senior member being Attorney E. M. Warner of the Mustatine Bar.
John T. Star, LL. B., '15 of Duluth,
Minn., was recently married to Miss
Mary M. Taff of Des Moines, Iowa.
Alumni congratulations.
From Elgin, Illinois, comes the report of the recent marriage of William E. Pierce LL B. '06, formerly
city attorney of Elgin, to Miss Nell
Agnes Wallace, of Elgin. The Reporter extends best wishes on behalf
of the alumni.
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A letter has just reached us from
Vincent Giblin, '19, who is attorney
for the Florida East Coast Hotel Co.,
Jacksonville, Fla., with enclosure of
an interesting specimen of pleading.
We are thankful for the enclosure,
and may make it useful in the April
number of the Reporter.
Llewellen James LL. B., '18, of
Kansas City, Mo., was a recent visitor
to the Hoynes' College of Law. He
related some experiences of his introduction into the practice of law. Mr.
James was making a business trip to
Chicago and took occasion to call at
the University, to look at the scenes
and the friends of college days.
Francis King, one of the Illinois
members of the Class of '19, paid us
a visit. He is trying to climb the
hights of the law.

ties and responsibilities will devolve
upon me, and I only hope and pray
thdt with my limited capacity I may
be able to function satisfactorily.'"
I-on. Albert J. Galen was attorney
general of Montana for eight years,
and during the late war was JudgeAdvocate-General of the A. E. F. in
Siberia.
The Tulsa Daily World of Tulsa,
Oklahoma, in a leader editorial for
the issue of January 18th, dwells
long and favorably on the possibilities of Judge Thomas D. Lyons, LL.
B., '06, a gubernatorial candidate of
promise for the campaign two years
hence. 'Tom' was an exceptionally
brilliant and popular student while
at Notre Dame, saw service overseas
in the past war, and has demonstrated his ability in public affairs in so
marked a way during the past few
years that little doubt exists as to his
ALUMNI "GREAT AND NEAR
capacity for the office which the press
GREAT"
and statesmen of Oklahoma are conFrom the Notre Dame Scholastic sidering for him."
we glean the following references to
"Thomas V. Craven, LL. B., '14,
alumni of the Law School who are has been recently appointed First
attaining prominence for themselves: Assistant District Attorney of his na"Mr. Albert J. Galen (LL.B., '96),
tive City, New Orleans, La. Tom
Associate-Justice of the Supreme has made rapid progress in his chosCourt of Montana, in a letter ac- en profession since he left Notre
knowledging the congratulations Dame. He was elected State Senasent by the President of the Univer- tor, was sent as delegate to the Consity on the occasion of the Judge's stitutional Convention, and in all his
recent election, writes: 'Whatever I assigned duties so conducted himself
have accomplished or may yet ac- as to be candidate for higher honors.
complish in life is due chiefly to the A letter from Governor John M.
interest which was taken in me dur- Parker accepting Tom's resignation
ing the years I attended Notre Dame. as State Senator to take up his new
If dear old Col. Hoynes is still alive, office had nothing but praise for the
I wish yould convey to him my best work of this son of Notre Dame."
wishes and advise him of my election. I should be very happy to have
ABOUT OURSELVES
my boy at Notre Dame, and have
been at work in an endeavor to bring
"The first quarterly issue of the
it about. . . . After the first of the Notre Dame Law Reporter for the
year many grave and important du- present year seems to indicate that
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this periodical, the publication of
which began last year, is destined to
be of great interest and value to the
students and alumni of the Hynes
College of Law. The current issue
contains, in addition to the reports
of cases of the last quarter of last
year and the Junior Moot Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme
Court of Notre Dame, an instructive
article contributed by Colonel William Hoynes, entitled "The Law and
'Lawyers,' a number of letters from
men of the class of '20 and news items
concerning other members of that
class. An excellent idea is the alumni directory of the College of Law,

begun in this number. All in all, the
faculty and the students of law are
to be complimented on the quality of
the Reporter."-The Notre Dame
Scholastic.
LAW REPORTER SUBSCRIPTIONS
Receipt of two dollars in payment
for the 1920-1921 subscription to the
Law Reporter from each of the following named alumni, is hereby acknowledged, towit: Earl F. Gruber,
Delbert D. Smith George J. Hanhauser, Sherwood Dixon, Robert L.
Bracken and Frank P. Burk.
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DIRECTORY
Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
ARIZONA
TusconJames V. Robins,
107 Melrose St.
ARKANSAS
Little RockAristo Brizzqlara,
217 E. Sixth St.
CALIFORNIA
Los AngelesTerence Coegrove,
1131 Title Insurance Bldg.
John G. Mott, of
Mott & Cross,
Citizens National Bank Bldg.
Michael J. McGarry,
530 Higgins Bldg.
Leo B. Ward,
4421 Willowbrook Ave.
San FranciscoAlphonsus Heer,
1601 Sacramento St.
COLORADO
TellurideJames Hanlon
CONNECTICUT
BridgeportDonato Lepore,
645 E. Washington Ave.
Raymond W. Murray,
784 Noble Ave.
HartfordJames Curry and Thos. Curry, of
Curry & Curry,
D'Esops Bldg., 647 Main St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WashingtonTimothy Ansberry,
208-12 Southern Bldg.
GEORGIA
AtlantaFay Wood,
225 E. Fourth St.
ILLINOIS
AuroraRobert Milroy,
113 Fox St.
BataviaJoseph Feldott
BelvidereStephen F. McGonigle,
1011 Whitney St.

BuddArthur B. Hughes
CampusFrancis T. Walsh
ChicagoFrancis O'Shaughenessy,
10 S. LaSalle St.
Hugh O'Neill,
Conway Bldg.
Charles W. Bachman,
836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
John Jos. Cook,
3171 Hudson Ave.
James V. Cunningham,
1610 Conway Bldg.
Hugh J. Daly,
614 Woodland Park
Leo J. Hassenauer,
1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
William C. Henry,
7451 Buell Ave.
John S. Hummer,
710-69 W. Washington St.
Albert M. Kelly,
2200 Fullerton Ave.
Daniel L. Madden,
Conway Building
Clement C. Mitchell,
69 W. Washington St.
William J. McGrath,
648 N. Carpenter St.
Thos. J. McManus,
5719 Michigan Ave.
John F. O'Connell,
155 N. Clark St.
Joseph P. O'Hara,
1060 The Rookery
Clifford O'Sullivan,
2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
Stephen F. Reardon,
405 Peoples Life Bldg.
Francis X. Rydzewskl,
8300 Burley Ave.
Delbert D. Smith,
3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
1350 First National Bank Bldg.
Max St. George,
108 S. LaSalle St.
DecaturWilliam P. Downey,
110 N. Water St.
DixonJohn Sherwood Dixon,
East OttowaHarry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Eastwood
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East St. LouisJoseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& MeGlynn,
120 N. Main St.
ElginThos. J. Hoban,
16 Chicago St.
Frank A. McCarthy,
18-14 Elgin National Bank Bldg.
Lawrence MeNerney,
Home Bank Bldg.
William Perce,
Opera House Bldg.
Elmer Tobin,
18 Chicago St.
GalesburgHon. Charles Craig
HoopestonGeorge E. Harbert,
827 E. Penn St.
HowardPaul J. Donovan
Kewanee-Thomas J. Welch,
Savings Bank Bldg.
LodaDaniel P. Keegan
MendotaJohn W. Dubbs,
Washington St.
MolinePeter Meersman,
205 Reliance Bldg.
Matthew McEniry,
408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. CarmelMartin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
OttowaRobert C. Carr, of
Johnson & Carr,
Central Life Bldg.
John E. Cassidy,
322 E. Superior St.
James J. Conway,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
Daniel C. Curtis,
519 Guthrie St.
Thomas O'Meara,
Route 27
Thomas O'Meara,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
PeoriaGeorge Sprenger,
Jefferson Bldg.
PoloRobert Bracken
RobinsonWilliam E. Bradbury,
RochelleThomas F. Healy
First National Bank Bldg.

Rock IslandFrancis A. Andrews,
631 Fifth St.
SpringfieldThomas Masters
Albert C. Schliff,
918 N. Sixth St.
StreatorElmer J. Mohan,
Route No. 3
WoodstockPaul Donovan,
Hoy Block
INDIANA
AndersonEdward C. McMahon,
2004 Fletcher St.
Philip O'Neill,
511-13-15 Union Bldg.
CrawfordsvilleJustin J. Molony,
706 Binford St.
ElkhartJames S. Dodge,
229-31 Monger Bldg.
Wilmer O'Brien,
325-6 Monger Bldg.
Robert Proctor,
201-5 Monger Bldg.
East ChicagoHugh E. Carroll
Fort WayneWilliam P. Breen, of
Breen & Morris,
Peoples Trust Bldg.
Joseph Haley,
202 Shoaff Bldg.
Cornelius B. Hayes,
New Hayes Hotel
Thomas A. Hayes,
501 Bass Block
Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
2725 S. Calhoun St.
Lawrence Stephan,
1431 Hugh St.
FrankfortEarl F. Gruber,
Dinwidie Bldg.
GaryHenry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,
of Snyder & Maloney,
738 Broadway
IndianapolisJames E. Deery,
316-324 Law Bldg.
Paul J. Smith,
2024 Central Ave.
KokomoGeorge F. Windoffer,
324 W. Jefferson St.
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LafayetteFrancis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.
Chas. E. and Vincent Vaughan, of
Vaughan & Vaughan,
710-711 Lafayette Bldg.
John W. Eggeman,
800 N. Fourth St.
LaGrangeGeorge D. McDonald,
114 Sixth Ave.
LintonHugh E. Carroll
MarionFred B. Mahaffey,
622 S. Brownson St.
Michigan CityLorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,.
Care T. M. J. and J. P. Kenefick
Louis Finski
MishawakaRalph Feig,
Mishawaka Trust Bldg.
John Schindler,
215 S. Main St.
MontgomeryBernard Heffernan,
Route 4
McCordsville-Harry Kelly
William H. Kelly
South BendLeo J. Cook,
410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. M. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,
R. F. D. 5, Box 18
Patrick Houlihan,
203 Title Bldg.
Arthur B. Hunter,
710 Portage Ave.
Floyd Pellison,
334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J. Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,
811 J. M. S. Bldg.
Ernest Morris,
Farmers Trust Bldg.
Thomas D. Mott,
522 Farmers Trust Bldg.
William McInerny,
104 Summers Bldg.
William B. O'Neill,
406 Citizens Bank Bldg.

John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.
Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,
125 N. Francis St.
VincennesLouis H. Hellert,
American Bank Bldg.
IOWA
CarrollJoseph J. Meyers,
201 Masonic Temple
Des MoinesWilliam J. Hynes,
504 Observatory Bldg.
Dubuque-Patrick J. Nelson,
200-6 Security Bldg.
Fort DodgeMichael F. Healy,
605-10 Snell lldg.
Emmet P. Mulholland, and
Clement B. Mulholland,
300 Snell Bldg.
Ida GroveMatthew M. White
Iowa CityJohn J. Ney
LenoxEugene F. McEniry
Mason CityJohn D. Wilson
MuscatineRichard B. Swift,
504 Laurel Bldg.
NewtonRalph Bergman
PrestonHarry Godes
WaverlyHumphrey L. Leslie,
204 S. State St.

KANSAS
Kansas CityRussell C. Hardy,
812 N. Fifth St.
Thomas V. Holland,
1623 Central Ave.
Theodore J. Lyons,
716 Pyle St.
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KENTUCKY
LebanonSamuel J. Spaulding,
Box 585
Samuel T. Spaulding
OwensboroAlbert Oberst,
Masonic Bldg.
LOUISIANA
New OrleansPatrick E. Burke,
307 Camp
Thomas V. Craven,
305 Wells Fargo Bldg.
MASSACHUSETTS
BostonWilliam P. Higgins,
730 Tremont Bldg.
SpringfieldWilliam J. Granfield
Court Square, Theatre Bldg.
MICHIGAN
DetroitHarry Cullen,
1226-30 Dime Bank Bldg.
Daniel Foley,
1626 Penobscot
Thomas A. McLaughlin,
76 Belmont Ave.
Louis C. Wurzer and F. Henry Wurzer,
Wurzer & Wurzer,
910 Majestic Bldg.
FlintVincent D. Ryan,
910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand RapidsJoseph Riley,
236 Valley Ave., N. W.
JacksonJames G. Henley,
117 W. Pearl
LansingMaurice D. Kirby,
310 Bauch Bldg.
MINNESOTA
CrookstonEdmund E. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Joseph H. Sylvester,
124 State St.
DuluthThomas McKeon,
817 Torrey Bldg.
MinneapolisEdward F. Barrett,
1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. CloudGeorge L. Murphy,
340 Seventh Ave., S.

M1ISSOURI
Kansas CityLeonard M. Carroll,
3117 Flora Ave.
Drexel L. Duffy,
201 Linwood Blvd.
Llewellyn D. James,
323 W. Armour Blvd.
John R. Meyers,
310 Ridge Bldg.
St. LouisJohn L. Corley,
Fullerton Bldg.
MONTANA
Butte-Timothy Downey,
21 Center St.
Frank C. Walker,
825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,
28 E. Quartz St.
GalenAlbert Galen,
Galen Block
MaltaWilliam McGarry
NEBRASKA
WahooFrank Kirchman,
Box 337
NEVADA
ElkoEdmund Carville,
Farrington Bldg.
Reno-Michael Diskin
NEW JERSEY
PlainfieldAndrew L. McDonough,
Babcock Bldg.
RockawayDaniel P. Murphy,
Wriebands Corporation
NEW MEXICO
Las VegasThomas V. Truder,
East Las Vegas
NEW YORK
AlbanyT. Paul McGannon,
Care Office Attorney-General
Buffalo-Max G. Kazus,
459 Amherst St.
GenevaFrancis T. McGrain,
9 State St.
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RochesterDaniel J. Quinlan,
47 Exchange St.
New York CitySimeon Flanagan,
Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter McElligott,
428 W. Twenty-fourth St.
PalmyraHarold P. Burke
WaverlyFrancis J. Clohessy,
455 Fulton St.
NORTH DAKOTA
MinotGeorge McGee
Park RiverJacob V. Birder
RugbyThomas Toner,
Main St.
OHIO
AkronClarence May,
427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter McCourt,
365 S. Main St.
CincinnatiErnest DuBrue,
835 Beecher Ave.
Cleveland1852 Ansell Road
Stanley B. Cofall,
Harry Miller,
Grasselli Chemical Co.
Walter Miller,
318 Leader News Bldg.
James O'Hara,
303 Park Bldg.
Hugh O'Neill,
1934 Euclid Ave.
ColumbusDonald Hamilton,
801-8 Huntington Bank Bldg.
.DaytonThomas Ford,
127 Maple St.
Joseph B. Murphy,
618 Dayton Savings & Trust Bldg.
John C. Shea,
Schwind Bldg.
HamiltonMichael O'Burns,
338 S. Second St.
LancasterMichael A. Dougherty,
343 E. Walnut
Harry P. Nester,
156 E. Chestnut St.

LimaFrancis W. Durbin,
607 Law Bldg.
MaumeePeter M. Ragan
NapoleonEdwin C. Donnelly,
827 Haley Ave.
SanduskyEdmund Savord,
Room 3, Sloan Block
ToledoRobert Dederich,
2619 Scottwood
Albert J. Kranz,
116 Nicholas Bldg.
Edwin J. Lynch,
642 Nicholas Bldg.
James T. McMahon,
2916 Collingwood Ave.
John B. McMahon,
940 Spitzer Bldg.
Arthur W. Ryan,
366 W. Central Ave.
OKLAHOMA
TulsaHarold R. Delaney,
1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
1115 Denver St., P. 0. Box 1957
OREGON
AstoriaJames L. Hope,
312-15 Spexarth Bldg.
IndependenceFrancis W. Kirkland
PortlandRoscoe Hurst,
1406 Yeon Bldg.
Frank Lonergan,
816 Electric Bldg.
Roger Sinnott,
Chamber of Commerce
WoodburnStephen Scollard
PENNSYLVANIA
HomesteadJohn J. Brislan,
400 McClure St.
JeanetteJohn W. Ely,
601 Germania Bank Bldg.
JohnstownJohn C. Larkin,
322 Wood Ave.
PhiladelphiaJames P. Fogarty,
1607-08 Finance Bldg.
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Edward Gallagher,
301 E. Lehigh Ave.
George Hanhauser,
401 Market St.
PittsburghDaniel C. Dillon,
811 Frick Bldg.
RydalEdward Britt
SOUTH DAKOTA
ChamberlainNicholas Furlong
EdgemontWilliam A. Guilfoyle
HowardTheodore Feyder
TENNESSEE
MemphisCharles McCauley,
383 N. Second St.
TEXAS
BeaumontHarry P. Barry,
Stark Bldg.
SintonBryan Odem,
Sinton State Bank
James F. Odem
WASHINGTON
CentraliaWilliam Cameron,
304 W. Plum St.
WISCONSIN
FennimoreRalph J. Lathrop
George F. Frantz, of
Clementson & Frantz,
Gravenbrock Bldg.
Green BayJohn Diener,
Room 1, Parmentier Bldg.
Milwaukee-Frank Burke,
904 Pabst Bldg.

Joseph E. Dorais,
Belvidere Apt., 58
Thomas C. Kelly,
66 Eighth St.
Chgauncey Yockey,
514 Wells Bldg.
Edward Yockey,
Merchants & Farmers Bank Bldg.
NeelsvilleGeorge A. Frantz
PlymouthGilbert P. Hand,
105 Milwaukee St.
RacineGrover F. Miller,
1116 College Ave.
SpartaJohn P. Doyle,
508 S.Water St.
SuperiorSherman May,
2016 Hammond St.
CUBA
CeinfuegosAndrew Castille,
Box 505
MIEXICO
Mexico CityAlfonso Anaya,
Qa, Apartado 52
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Beinaton UnionBernardo Lopez
ManilaJose Manuel Gonzales
Turlac, TarlacJose Urquico
Misamia ProvinceEmilio Aranus
SorsogenDoroteo Amador

